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Over the past decade the United Nations has developed a framework consistent with 
conserving carbon and biodiversity-rich forests while simultaneously reducing global greenhouse 
gas emissions. The project, known as REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries), was created as an international framework to halt 
deforestation, specifically in tropical nations. By valuing forests in terms of their ecosystem 
services, as opposed to solely their export value, REDD+ aims to encourage financially 
developing countries to preserve natural carbon sinks and decrease the number of forests 
converted to alternate uses. Putting a price tag on the role forest ecosystems play in carbon 
capture and storage allows forest conservation to compete economically with historically more 
lucrative forest exploitation practices.  
The first country to facilitate REDD+ implementation was Indonesia in 2009. As the 
world’s top greenhouse gas emitter from deforestation, degradation, and land-use change, 
Indonesia has a unique opportunity to achieve substantial emissions reductions at relatively low 
abatement costs. In 2011, Indonesia and Norway signed a landmark deal stipulating that Norway 
would pay Indonesia USD $1 billion if the country verifiably reduced carbon emissions 
stemming from deforestation and peatland conversion. After nearly a decade of ineffective 
policies and reforms ridden with loopholes, Indonesia finally recorded three consecutive years of 
declining emissions, beginning in 2017. While this pollution prevention represents a success for 
the environment, climate change mitigation, and REDD+ stakeholders around the world, there is 
room for improvement. If Indonesia is to have any hope of achieving its 2030 emissions 
reductions targets, more extensive reforms and stronger regulatory forces ought to be enacted. 
This paper discusses the feasibility and rationale behind the current REDD+ offset project 
operating in Indonesia. The challenge for Indonesia is for such an offset system to achieve 
economic growth, social equity, and reduced forest cover loss simultaneously. If not, the policy 
could reveal that the triple-win scenario is rooted in inherently contradictory goals, thus 
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Topic 1: History of Emissions Trading Systems  
 
 
Part 1: Carbon Markets and How They Work 
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
proposed greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a possible new trading commodity. By 1997, the 
first international agreement for limiting GHG emissions was developed, known as the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Protocol sets emissions limits for 37 industrialized countries and the European 
community, including limits on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Kyoto Protocol, 1998). As a 
result, CO2 could be traded as a commodity, known as the “carbon market” (Collin, 2011). Two 
types of true carbon market trading systems were created, “cap-and-trade” and “carbon-offsets.” 
Cap-and-trade (CAT) mechanisms have been more widely used than carbon-offsets, as concerns 
have been raised about whether offset projects produce their intended results.  
 Emissions trading is “a regulatory environmental policy to reduce the cost of pollution 
control by providing economic incentives to regulated industries for achieving reductions in the 
emissions of pollutants” (Collin, 2011). For CAT, a central authority sets a limit (or cap) on a 
regulated pollutant. Industries that exceed their limits can purchase emissions “credits” from 
firms that emit below permitted limits. This transfer of emissions credits is referred to as 
emissions trading. Every CAT system includes an emissions cap, which limits pollution emitted 
from all regulated sources. The upper limit could be set below historical emissions rates to 
induce emissions reductions. Each CAT system also includes allowances, which are an 
authorization to emit the upper limit on pollution, measurement systems to track emissions, and 
flexibility for any source to choose how to reduce emissions. Some strategies for source 
reduction can include transitioning to renewable energy or buying additional allowances from 
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other sources that reduce their emissions. For example, a firm can buy or sell allowances on the 
open market. Each CAT system has a compliance process, where at the end of each compliance 
period every source is expected to have at least as many allowances as it has emissions (Collin, 
2011). For a CAT system to work, pollution sources must measure and report all emissions, as 
without proper monitoring and verification, emissions could be unreported, meaning that excess 
pollution sources could exist and undermine the legitimacy of the cap. 
 Cap-and-trade systems seek to harness market forces to create incentives for industries to 
use more efficient industrial processes that reduce the amount of CO2 emissions. If a company is 
able to prevent pollution it can trade its value in the form of credits to other dischargers. 
Companies with older, more polluting plants can buy carbon permits and stay in business. 
Buying permits reduces the older company’s profits, and thereby provides incentives to invest in 
less polluting processes in future plant designs. If many companies continue polluting, then the 
scarcity of carbon permits will increase their price, providing even further incentives for 
developing processes with fewer emissions (Waskey, 2012). 
 Cap-and-trade systems have been criticized by some US environmentalists who argue 
that if firms’ emission levels are self-reported, they may or may not be accurate. Some analysts 
argue that CAT allows polluters to buy out of responsibility for environmental and community 
impacts, thus widening the gap towards achieving a sustainable society (Collin, 2011). The US 
has experience with one CAT system, the 1990 Acid Rain Program, to reduce sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) emissions causing acid rain problems (Collin, 2011). In response to the new regulations, 
SO2 emissions were reduced in a shorter time period and at a cost lower than was expected, 
marking it as an example of a significant success story regarding CAT (Collin, 2011). The Kyoto 
Protocol sought to use trading to help developed countries reduce GHG emissions by 5% from 
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1990 levels by 2012. Emissions reductions stipulated by the Protocol varied by country; in the 
EU, an 8% reduction in emissions was required (Dernbach, 2010).  
 The Kyoto Protocol established conditions for the first non-voluntary carbon market by 
committing certain nations to meet GHG emissions reduction targets and by establishing a 
framework for allowance trading across international borders. Since the Protocol’s international 
carbon market has yet to develop, regional carbon markets, such as the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the world’s largest CAT system, have begun. One Kyoto 
Protocol provision has endured, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offset program, 
which has garnered much attention and helped develop the world’s largest CO2  offsetting 
projects (Newell, 2014). Traditional carbon-offset systems are based on trading emissions 
between industrialized countries and poorer, less developed countries. Offsets allow 
industrialized countries to release emissions in trade for preventing emissions in developing 
countries and compensating them with carbon credits (Waskey, 2012). The CDM extends this 
premise by encouraging environmentally conscious development, or “clean” development. The 
CDM’s twin pillars are to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development, 
while at the same time helping developed countries meet their emissions reduction requirements 
(Dernbach, 2010). This type of system can run parallel with CAT, in which the cap is intended to 
set a limit on offsets. Carbon-offset projects generate credits that allow pollution over and above 
this limit (Waskey, 2012). 
The CDM is attractive as an offset trading program due to differences in pollution 
prevention costs between developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, CDM programs 
raise a number of implementation and methodology issues. The Kyoto Protocol stipulates that 
CDM emissions reductions must be “additional to any that would occur in the absence of the 
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certified project activity.” In practice, incremental prevention can be difficult to determine. As a 
consequence, credits may be awarded for reductions that would have occurred regardless of the 
CDM project’s implementation (Dernbach, 2010). CDM projects that seek to reduce CO2 
emissions through forestry have a challenge to directly determine the exact reductions being 
achieved. Reductions can only be estimated through calculations based on models and 
projections, which may or may not be accurate. In contrast, power plants participating in 
emissions trading are subject to continuous monitoring, and therefore it’s relatively easy to 
determine the actual reductions being achieved (Dernbach, 2010). CDM projects in developing 
countries are subject to those countries’ legal systems, which are often weaker and may be 
affected by corruption. As a consequence, conducting CDM projects in countries with weak legal 
systems may be a challenge, as it may be harder to enforce agreements for reductions or 
guarantee the integrity of reductions in these countries (Dernbach, 2010).  
Stanford researchers report that CDM markets may not reduce actual emissions, and that 
offsets are not likely to be effective cost-control mechanisms (Wu, 2012). Further structural 
problems affecting offset mechanisms are a shifting of responsibility, perverse incentives, 
repression and rights violations, and preservation of the status quo (Wu, 2012). By allowing 
companies and governments from developed countries to buy credits from projects in third-world 
countries, offsetting mechanisms in effect provide a means of delaying domestic action in these 
wealthier, industrialized countries (Wu, 2012). Offsets are subject to interpretation of 
“additionality,” where pollution prevention offsets are compared to what would have happened 
otherwise, offering polluting companies the opportunity to turn unforeseeable future events into 
present and bankable carbon credits. The net result for the planet is that offsets tend to increase 
rather than reduce GHG emissions by displacing the need to take action in one location by a 
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theoretical claim to take different actions in another location. Countries hosting offset projects 
create a barrier to implementation of environmental regulations, for in doing so would reduce 
additionality and thus cut potential revenue (Wu, 2012). 
The underlying reason for structural problems that undermine offset projects’ good 
intentions is the CDM’s premise of dubious equivalences between polluted discharges in very 
different economic and industrial practices (Wu, 2012). By overlooking the uncertainties of 
comparison between emissions output in one part of the world and the sequestration of emissions 
in another, these dubious equivalences ensure the exchange of a single commodity, carbon. The 
premise does nothing to address the fact that the effects of burning coal are in no way eliminated 
by building a new renewable energy source or creating a monoculture plantation. Instead, the 
premise serves to burst the limit that CAT mechanisms create. While CAT limits the availability 
of pollution permits, offset projects have become a license to print new ones (Wu, 2012). When 
combined, the two systems therefore tend to undermine each other: CAT sets the cap, but offsets 
create conditions to lift it. Nevertheless, many CAT programs today allow offset credits to be 
traded within them, including the EU ETS and California’s trading scheme (Wu, 2012). 
The commodification of carbon and its subsequent trading, as well as the theoretical 
attractiveness of CDM projects enabled the “green economy,” or “green capitalism,” as a way to 
overcome the negative effects of conventional development, for example by increasing 
investments in low-carbon technologies, shifting energy-use towards renewable sources, and 
more sustainable management of natural resources such as fisheries and forests (Anderson, 
2016). Agriculture, and its associated land use change, contributes to about a third of the global 
greenhouse gas emissions. Environmental policy makers encourage landholders to develop more 
environmentally conscious land use strategies to prevent pollution (Cacho, 2013). The green 
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economy has manifested itself in many ways, including the growth in corporate social 
responsibility, the rise of ethical investment, partnerships between conservation organizations 
and big business, and the rise of green consumer goods (Scales, 2016).  
The basic principle of the concept is that the market can provide incentives to companies 
to operate in environmentally benign ways without curtailing growth. It requires companies to 
view climate change mitigation strategies as preparation for longer-term business and 
development opportunities rather than a source of short-term costs (Anderson, 2016). If properly 
conducted, the implementation of a green economy has the potential to result in “improved 
human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and 
ecological scarcities,” according to the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) (Anderson, 
2016). However, in order to separate negative environmental and social externalities from 
economic growth, a green economy relies on market reforms, industrial advancements, and 
consumer preference to drive social and ecological change, a principle that a number of analysts 
have critiqued (Anderson, 2016). 
One critique is that a green economy focused on marketable aspects of the environment 
may fail to address issues of social justice or relations between nature and society. A green 
economy discourse obscures the role that economic growth per se plays in degrading the 
environment, and undermines the political will to make substantive environmental reforms. In 
other words, green economy principles may be only a symbolic commitment to sustainability, 
and a form of “green-washing” that allow industries or countries to appear proactive in the face 
of anthropogenic climate change while continuing processes of accumulation and unrestrained 
resource extraction (Anderson, 2016).  
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Despite these criticisms, the green economy has continued to gain popularity among 
politicians and international organizations such as the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) and the World Bank. For example, in countries with tropical forests, the strongest 
expression of the green capitalism trend has been the proliferation of Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) (Scales, 2016). As many land managers around the world are smallholder 
producers with limited ability to bear the costs of new environmental regulations, PES to 
landowners directly has become common. As modification of agricultural practices in 
developing countries can create positive environmental externalities to people living in 
developed countries, PES can affect economic development and poverty reduction (Zilberman, 
2008). In such cases, costs associated with environmental regulation may be diverted from the 
landowners to the consumers of the environmental service. Landowner participation can yield 
both opportunity and transaction costs. For example, land use modification may create more 
sustainable yet less profitable outcomes. Costs associated with contracting, monitoring, 
reporting, and verifying the environmental service provision can be high (Cacho, 2013). 
Payments for ecosystem services are voluntary transactions where prices are set based on 
the same valuation of ecosystem functions; those who benefit pay the suppliers (Scales, 2016). 
Forests provide a wide range of ecosystem services, so their carbon storage functions have 
proved the easiest to define and quantify. In response to these trends, in 2008 the UN launched 
the Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD). This program enables CO2 emitters in high-
income countries to pay low-income countries to preserve their forests, and thus not release CO2. 
UN-REDD therefore offers the prospect of a triple-win scenario, with the potential to create 
opportunities for economic growth and poverty alleviation, incentives for the maintenance of 
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biological diversity, and financial support for conservation programs (Scales, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the commodification of forest carbon, a necessary component for UN-REDD and 
other PES, has also garnered considerable critique.  
It is not easy to quantify and value forest carbon. A commodity that can be easily 
exchanged should have clear boundaries and property rights, neither of which are common for 
tropical forests. Unclear and contested ownership of tropical forests may be rooted in 
colonialism. In some cases European nations claimed the forests under their regimes, but in 
practice they mostly remained under local customary ownership and management (Scales, 2016). 
Forests have many different uses and values depending on the stakeholder and their culture, 
including a wide range of economic values, cultural and spiritual values, and broader ecosystem 
services. The attractiveness of valuing forests for their carbon content is that this measure 
reduces the socioecological complexity to carbon in trees as a relatively simple and universal 
single metric (Scales, 2016). 
 Nonetheless, connecting trees to traders to buyers requires a complex commodity chain 
that involves a diverse range of actors. Calculating forest carbon requires expert environmental 
consultants. Trading carbon requires financial experts and mechanisms. This has led to the 
creation of a new political economy of tropical forests with its own distinctive division of labor 
and elites (Scales, 2016). Payments for ecosystem services thus tend to be associated with high 
transaction costs due to the range of actors and the diversity of services being exchanged. Carbon 
levels may be difficult to measure and there is asymmetry of information between buyers and 
sellers regarding the actual costs of producing a service (Cacho, 2013). These high transaction 
costs lead to inefficiencies in the implementation of functional offsetting mechanisms. 
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The commodification of carbon necessary for green economies to operate in tropical-
forested nations has implications for forest politics. PES requires clear ownership rights. Forest 
tenure is often ambiguous in the tropics and a source of tension between governments and local 
communities. There are also concerns that the potential for forests to start generating carbon 
income under schemes such as UN-REDD will lead to “green-grabbing,” where elites 
appropriate land and natural resources for both environmental ends and further wealth 
accumulation (Scales, 2016). Green-grabbing and unclear ownership rights have made it easier 
for carbon offsets to result in dispossessing rural communities of their lands.  
Payments for ecosystem services also have the potential to affect resource-use politics in 
more subtle ways. For example, farmers in Chiapas, Mexico are altering land-use strategies and 
planting carbon-sequestering trees as a new form of income. To benefit from forest carbon 
payments these households are shifting from short-term food production to managing longer-
term, forestry-based income. This proves easier for wealthier households, which have more land 
and capital, and can therefore allocate more land, time, and labor to carbon forestry. 
Furthermore, this long-term and uncertain investment in carbon forestry requires a shift in 
resource management from subsistence to long-term, a burden felt by those in charge of 
managing household budgets and nutritional needs (Scales, 2016). For projects valuing the CO2 
contained in biomass and soils, predicting outcomes and monitoring adherence to contract terms 
over vast areas of topographically diverse land can be expensive. Transaction costs arise from 
uncertainty over the permanence of sequestered carbon stocks and uncertainty about humans and 
the value of agreements they make. The risk of the reversal of sustainable land use practices after 
payment is received further increases the costs of monitoring and enforcing, and may also lead to 
additional litigation costs (Cacho, 2013).  
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Both the drastic and subtle changes to forest politics and management that arise from 
carbon offset projects should serve as a reminder to nations and NGOs promoting carbon forestry 
that the rural poor are not a homogeneous mass, and that the costs and benefits of carbon forestry 
are rarely evenly distributed among households. Poor households can have the most barriers to 
benefitting from new sources of income. Forest management projects can consider the distinct 
needs of the poorest individuals and groups, address social and economic barriers to 
participation, and develop sources of income that operate on short, medium, and long timescales 
(Scales, 2016). In following these principles, offset programs can prevent rights violations and 
create poverty alleviation opportunities.  
Some forest management projects may overlook the rural communities (Scales, 2016). 
For example, a REDD project that focuses on the global importance of tropical forests, may not 
sufficiently acknowledge the local importance of forest resources or violence committed in the 
name of forest management (Scales, 2016). Different stakeholders can value forests in ways that 
not only compete, but also conflict with each other. This has made win-win and triple-win 
scenarios difficult. Although the incentives may align, in practice, actors stand behind conflicting 
motives and may advocate for policies to help them achieve their goals while undermining those 
of others. Policy loopholes can allow greedy players to circumvent regulations, undermining any 
trading system.  
Although carbon offsetting and PES share many uncertainties, the theory behind them 
has led to global efforts to protect tropical forests as some of the world’s most important yet 
imperiled carbon sinks. To do so against the will of powerful actors dominating extractive 
industries may prove to be a challenge, but so will building enough support from the public. The 
 15 
following section describes this global drive to reduce deforestation and mitigate climate change, 
and how a strategy known as REDD+ developed as a result.  
 
Part 2: Carbon Sequestration Policies and Forest Conservation—REDD+ Theory 
Protecting natural carbon stores in forests is a means of ensuring that more carbon 
emissions do not enter the atmosphere and contribute to global warming. The most important 
natural carbon sinks on the planet are plants, soils, and the ocean, which sequester carbon and 
thereby store huge amounts of it. Unless these carbon sinks are preserved, stored carbon that has 
been stored for hundreds if not thousands of years may be released, risking accelerating climate 
change. Tropical forests are critical carbon sinks for the whole planet, yet they continue to be 
destroyed at alarming rates. Environmentalists and conservationists alike are therefore resolved 
to reducing this deforestation rate. In doing so, fewer carbon emissions would be released, more 
CO2 would be sequestered, and irreplaceable biodiversity would be saved. 
Heat-trapping CO2 is released into the atmosphere when carbon sinks are destroyed, 
either by the burning or degradation of organic matter. Deforestation and forest degradation, 
especially in the tropics, represents the second largest source of anthropogenic carbon emissions, 
and thus climate change (Enrici, 2016). The conversion of tropical forests to other land uses, 
such as plantations or pastures, contributes to approximately 10% of net global carbon 
emissions—more than the entire planet’s transport sector (REDD Desk, 2013). As the primary 
component of man-made emissions contributing to global warming, ending or reducing 
deforestation rates represents one prerequisite for any effective climate change response 
(Holloway, 2009).  
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Forests of all types make up 31% of the land area on our planet, a total of just over 4 
billion hectares. They provide essential goods, such as timber and paper. Forests also supply 
indispensable ecosystem services, as they filter water, control water runoff, protect soil, regulate 
climate, cycle and store nutrients, and provide habitat to sustain the world’s biodiversity (Adams, 
2012). Nevertheless, global forest cover continues to decrease each year. According to data from 
the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), deforestation rates were highest in the 
1990s, when each year an average of 16 million hectares of forests were lost (Adams, 2012). 
Even when some forest areas expanded from natural processes or planting by humans, the net 
global forest lost an average of 8.3 million hectares per year (Adams, 2012). In the first decade 
of the century, deforestation rates decreased to 13 million hectares per year, for a global net 
forest loss of 5.2 million hectares per year (Adams, 2012). Since 2010, however, the world has 
seen an increase in global deforestation rates. In both 2016 and 2017, almost 30 million total 
hectares of forest cover was lost, resulting in a 9% decrease in forest cover since 2000 and 98.7 
gigatons (Gt) of CO2 emissions released (Global Forest Watch, 2018). Land clearing for 
agriculture and pasture is the primary source of forest loss, followed by harvesting wood for fuel 
or other industrial purposes and then wildfires (Adams, 2012). For example, in 2015, Indonesia 
suffered damage from a wildfire that burned more than 6 million acres, caused the premature 
death of 100,000 people, and cost the country at least USD $16.1 billion (Hurowitz, 2018).  
Global deforestation rates do not capture the full extent of damage from selective 
logging, road construction, climate change, and other human actions. Each year fewer forests 
remain. Those forests that remain may be less effective as carbon sinks. For example, replacing 
natural old-growth (“primary”) forests with plantation monocultures greatly reduces biodiversity 
while increasing emissions from the felling of old trees (Adams, 2012). Primary tropical 
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rainforests, particularly those that have never been disturbed by humans, are home to trees 
hundreds or even thousands of years old. They hold huge amounts of stored carbon and 
irreplaceable biodiversity. In 2018, the tropics lost a combined total of 12 million hectares of tree 
cover, the fourth-highest annual loss since the turn of the century. Of this total loss, primary 
forests made up 3.6 million hectares (see Fig. 1.1) (Weisse, 2019). Once cut down, these forests 
may never return to their original state.  
Figure 1.1: Global Tropical Primary Forest Loss 
Source: Weisse, 2019 
 
 
The few remaining original forest ecosystems on Earth are not the only ones that matter. 
Secondary forests are those that have been disturbed by human activity in the past, but are 
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regenerating over time, restoring wildlife and carbon to the land. Secondary forests make up the 
majority of the world’s remaining forests, including more than two-thirds in Asia, and an even 
greater portion in North and Central America (Hurowitz, 2018). Many companies and 
governments have made agreements to protect these forests and control deforestation.  
Forests are not only a resource for limiting climate change, they also contribute directly 
to the livelihoods of 90 percent of 1.2 billion people living in abject poverty (The World Bank, 
2004). Of these people, 500 million are considered to be forest-dependent, a term used to 
describe human populations that derive benefits from forests in some way, and 200 million are 
indigenous (Chao, 2012). Forest-dependent communities are often made up of rural people living 
in poverty, specifically in substantially forested developing countries (Newton, 2016). Forests 
support the livelihoods of these people and their local communities by providing them with food, 
fuel, fodder, livestock, medicine, and shelter (Chao, 2012). As forests also contribute products to 
international supply chains, they contribute to human welfare and decrease global poverty (The 
World Bank, 2004). Thus, reducing deforestation provides the opportunity to decrease global 
warming emissions while at the same time increasing the resilience of those people most 
vulnerable to its effects.  
The ecosystem services that forests provide for the environment and life on earth go 
beyond carbon storage and emissions offsets. Forests benefit the health and livelihoods of 
people, control water, food, and nutrient cycling, and improve climate security. Tropical forests 
help to cool down the Earth’s surface through a double-cooling effect, both by reducing carbon 
emissions and maintaining high levels of evaporation from the canopy (REDD Desk, 2013). 
These life-sustaining ecosystem services are not confined within national borders; all people are 
reliant upon them, regardless of location or socioeconomic status. It’s in our collective interest to 
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ensure that these services are sustained into the future. However, essential ecosystem services 
remain undervalued, and therefore may not compete with the more immediate gains delivered 
from converting forests into commodities (REDD Desk, 2013). 
Given that reducing deforestation is considered to be the single largest opportunity for 
cost-effective and immediate reductions of carbon emissions, analysts report that combating 
deforestation and degradation practices in tropical countries ought to be part of any concerted 
effort to combat climate change (Holloway, 2009). Traditional methods of reducing deforestation 
have been largely unsuccessful, particularly in the last two decades. The world community has 
since created a strategy for valuing tropical forests. Known as REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries), it is an international framework 
to halt deforestation. Through this framework, developing countries are paid for any emissions 
reductions achieved by decreasing the number of forests converted to alternate uses. After 
identifying current and/or projected rates of deforestation and degradation, a country taking 
remedial actions to reduce its loss rates will be rewarded financially relative to the extent of 
reduced emissions (REDD Desk, 2013). 
REDD provides an opportunity for countries to achieve substantial emissions reductions 
at relatively low abatement costs. By putting a price tag on the role forest ecosystems play in 
carbon capture and storage, it allows forest conservation to compete economically with 
historically more lucrative forest exploitation practices (REDD Desk, 2013). Although the idea 
of REDD became formal at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) 13th Conference of Parties (COP-13) in Bali in 2007, its roots date back to the 
Kyoto Protocol’s adoption in 1997. In Article 2, the Protocol refers to the protection and 
enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, sustainable forest management 
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practices, and afforestation and reforestation activities (Kyoto Protocol, 1998). As of 1997, only 
afforestation and reforestation activities were eligible to receive credits under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (Holloway, 2009).  
Forest protection has evolved from a RED policy to REDD+ based on improved methods 
to measure, record, and verify activities. Many of these improved methods arose from the role of 
land-use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities that countries committed to under 
Kyoto, after years of debate and discussion on how to improve policies (Holloway, 2009). The 
initial forest policy was RED (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation). It has been modified to 
REDD+ over the years to include a more comprehensive approach to combating climate change. 
For example, at COP-13 in 2007, the Bali Action Plan was formulated, which stated that this 
approach should include not only “policy incentives on issues relating to reducing deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries,” but that it should also encompass “the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of carbon stocks in 
developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2008). Within a year, these latter three approaches were 
upgraded so as to receive the same emphasis as avoided emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation. At COP-16 in 2010, REDD was changed to REDD+ to reflect the addition of these 
important new components (REDD Desk, 2013).  
Within its scope, REDD+ has the ability to contribute simultaneously to climate change 
mitigation, rural development and poverty alleviation, and the conservation of biodiversity and 
vital ecosystem services (Phelps, 2012). Protecting forests for their carbon sequestration abilities 
has the potential to also contribute substantially to biodiversity conservation. A REDD+ 
mechanism that seeks to reduce emissions and increase environmental co-benefits may create 
considerable environmental and economic tradeoffs for development and conservation objectives 
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(Phelps, 2012). Once REDD+ frameworks are put in place, one continuous challenge is how to 
measure, monitor, and verify REDD+ activities (REDD Desk, 2013). The further incorporation 
of co-benefits such as biodiversity conservation and rural development has only made 
monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems more complicated (Visseren-Hamakers, 
2012).  
By 2012, many bilateral and multilateral initiatives sought to prepare developing 
countries for REDD+. For example, Indonesia has developed national REDD+ strategies through 
multi-stakeholder processes and pilot programs which were implemented to test different 
approaches (Visseren-Hamakers, 2012). REDD+ development and implementation follows three 
sequential phases to prepare each country for REDD+: readiness, demonstration activities, and 
results-based actions. In phase 1 (readiness), countries formulate detailed REDD+ strategies on 
how to implement new reforms and regulations. In phase 2 (demonstration activities), these 
policy reforms are put in place. By phase 3 (results-based actions), the country should participate 
in results-based actions and receive compensation (Visseren-Hamakers, 2012; Ekawati, 2019). 
The REDD+ strategy emphasizes a learning-by-doing process, allowing countries to study and 
monitor progress and failures, develop unique capacities, and use research to evaluate outcomes 
(Visseren-Hamakers, 2012). 
Funding for REDD+ activities will affect how quickly these countries achieve verified 
emissions reduction results. Reliable and sufficient funding will make a difference both in the 
short term (to help countries prepare for REDD+ policy implementation), and the long term (to 
secure sustainable payments for carbon credits). According to some analysts, most REDD+ 
funding consists of short-term ‘fast-start’ finance aimed at capacity building and the 
development of national strategies and action plans (Visseren-Hamakers, 2012). Once in phase 3 
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of implementation, countries will be ready to receive compensations for REDD+ at the national 
level. A diverse set of funding mechanisms exist today; public or private; fund-based or market-
based; and multilateral or bilateral. The availability of sufficient and durable funding will depend 
on the political commitment of countries and private actors to invest in REDD+ (Visseren-
Hamakers, 2012). 
The United Nations created the UN-REDD Program to support the 65 countries across 
Africa, Asia Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean participating in REDD+ readiness and 
implementation activities (UN FAO, 2020). Launched in 2008 just after the Bali Action Plan was 
formed, the UN-REDD Program uses the technical expertise and collaborative support of the 
FAO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP). Via these forces, UN-REDD supports nationally led REDD+ 
projects and promotes the involvement of all stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and 
other forest-dependent communities, in national and international REDD+ implementation (UN-
REDD Programme, 2019). UN-REDD provides direct support to the design and implementation 
of national REDD+ programs. It builds technical capacity through the sharing of expertise, 
common approaches, analyses, methodologies, tools, data, and best practices across countries 
(UN-REDD Programme, 2019). UN-REDD also conducts needs assessments to help identify 
capacity gaps so that technical support, policy advice, training, and other capacity development 
endeavors can be tailored specifically to each country (UN FAO, 2020). In developing these 
capacities, UN-REDD assists partner countries to meet REDD+ requirements in order to qualify 
to receive results-based payments under UNFCCC.  
Indonesia is an excellent case study for evaluating how REDD+ and other green economy 
strategies have fared in reality. Indonesia has the third largest area of tropical forests of all 
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nations on the planet. It is also the world’s largest emitter of CO2 from deforestation and land-
use change (Barr, 2010). In accepting and following the principles of a green economy, 
Indonesia has the potential to increase economic growth, preserve its imperiled tropical forests 
and unique biodiversity, and reduce its GHG emissions significantly (Anderson, 2016). This 
paper explores the complex relation between the REDD+ Strategy, forest commodification, 
decentralized political forces, local and civil society, forest conservation, and carbon 
sequestration strategies. It investigates challenges of turning green economy theory into reality, 
as well as its capacity to achieve simultaneously its three core values of economic growth, social 

















Topic 2: The Case for Indonesia 
 
 
Part 1: Background on Indonesia 
 Since the early 2000s, Indonesia has been a major GHG emitter. Their emissions are five 
times more likely to come from deforestation and forest fires than from its energy and industrial 
sectors (PEACE, 2007). For example, one report states that 85% of Indonesia’s greenhouse gas 
emissions stem from land use activities, 37% of which is attributed to deforestation, and 27% of 
which comes from peat fires (PEACE, 2007). In 2015 Indonesia struggled to control massive 
peatland megafires that arose from slash-and-burn agricultural practices. That year, Indonesia 
produced 9.2 tons of CO2 per capita, surpassing the global average of 7.0 tons per capita, and 
falling only behind the United States, which produced 20.4 tons of CO2 per capita. Indonesia also 
became the fourth largest emitter of GHG in the world that year, comprising 4.8% of the world’s 
total emissions (see Fig. 2.1) (Dunne, 2019).  
Indonesia has the potential to reduce GHG emissions levels by limiting deforestation and 
protecting peatlands. As the global human population continues to increase, demand for 
agricultural products intensifies, leading to further transformation of biodiversity-rich rainforests 
into agricultural landscapes (Singh, 2013). Indonesia, along with many other tropical countries, 
has faced economic pressure to continue agricultural expansion. This expansion is a leading 
cause of deforestation, biodiversity loss, and environmental degradation (Singh, 2013). Other 
drivers of deforestation in Indonesia include mining, logging, aquaculture, and forest fires. Over 
the past fifteen years, Indonesia has seen a substantial increase in the number of mining 
businesses operating in forest areas (Kartodihardjo, 2015). As of 2015, 379 different 
corporations were mining within conservation forest areas, where mining is “not permitted” 
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according to Indonesian forest governance. This led to the exploitation of over 1.3 million 
hectares of land which should have been prohibited (Kartodihardjo, 2015). Illegal logging is yet 
another major source of deforestation in Indonesia. According to estimates from the 
Environmental Intelligence Agency (EIA), illegal logging costs the country an estimated USD $2 
billion a year in lost revenue, taxes, and duties (Permitting Crime, 2015).  
Figure 2.1: Indonesia’s Total Emissions, 2000-2016 
  Source: Dunne, 2019 
 
 Behind Indonesia’s extensive land-use transformation are strong economic drivers. The 
total export value of forest products, including timber and its products, coal, palm oil, and 
petroleum, continues to rise. Palm oil is a significant Indonesian export, as it is one of the most 
rapidly expanding crops in the world due to its variety of uses as both as a food source and as a 
raw material for consumer goods such as cosmetics, industrial lubricants, and biofuels (Dunne, 
2019). Palm oil monocultures as a replacement of natural forest cover has driven widespread 
deforestation in Indonesia over the past 20 years, affecting the region’s biodiversity. The 
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plantations support less biodiversity than both the primary forests and the disturbed and logged 
forests that they replace, mainly due to the lack of structurally complex vegetation on plantations 
(Singh, 2013). Indonesia supports 53% of the world’s palm oil cultivation, employing an 
estimated 3.7 million people. Palm oil is the county’s third most profitable export behind coal 
and petroleum (Dunne, 2019). Palm oil’s contribution to deforestation in Indonesia reflects 
profits from global palm oil, where demand continues to drive its expansion even further into the 
nation’s imperiled forests.  
Of all major GHG emitters, Indonesia as a country stands to lose the most from the 
impacts of climate change. Deforestation practices and peatland megafires continuously emit 
massive amounts of greenhouse gasses in the area, making Indonesia even more susceptible to 
temperature increases. Even a modest temperature increase could lead to detrimental impacts. As 
an archipelago in the tropics, it is at major risk of sea level rise, prolonged droughts, and major 
floods resulting in devastating landslides (Edwards, 2012). 
The increase in ambient temperature in Indonesia may affect the region’s hydrological 
cycle, including its evaporation, transpiration, run-off, soil moisture, and precipitation patterns. 
One analyst suggests that there will be increased intensity of rainfall over shorter periods due to 
the prolonged dry season, with a greater likelihood of more intense droughts (Sari, 2007). 
Greater intensity of rainfall increases risks associated with major flooding and landslide events. 
A decrease in crop production as a result of these combined effects could reduce food security in 
the country, affecting agricultural employment and the livelihood of average Indonesians, as 
46% of employment is in the agricultural sector, making up 16% of the country’s total GDP as of 
2007 (Sari, 2007).  
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Greater rainfall intensity can accelerate soil erosion and soil loss. If soil fertility and 
productivity decline, particularly in upland regions, upland crop yields, such as soybean and 
maize, may decrease by 20 to 40 percent. Impacts will be most strongly felt by farmers in upland 
areas who will suffer from deteriorating soil quality and abrupt changes in water supplies due to 
soil erosion and new precipitation patterns (Sari, 2007).    
Another major concern for the people of Indonesia is the threat of rising sea levels. As an 
archipelago with over 17,000 islands and 80,000 kilometers of coastline, Indonesia is vulnerable 
to even slight sea level increases. Different sources have given varying estimates on the annual 
sea level rise in Indonesia, from 2.5 mm/ year to 7 mm/ year (Jakarta Post, 2019). Some 
scientists claim to have more accurate estimates due to a new digital elevation model developed 
by Climate Central called CoastalDEM (Jakarta Post, 2019). Previous estimates may have 
underestimated future inundation risks from rising sea levels. A CoastalDEM analysis shows that 
currently 23 million Indonesians live below high tide levels—a number that vastly exceeds the 5 
million people that previous models estimated would be affected (Jakarta Post, 2019). The report 
does not quantify the economic or humanitarian costs that have and will continue to arise in 
efforts to keep the sea at bay. According to the report, CoastalDEM’s elevation data shows that 
by 2100, “land currently home to 200 million people could fall permanently below the high tide 
line.” The report then states that cutting global emissions will lower the number of people in 
Indonesia affected by flooding or permanent inundation by 20 million people at the end of the 
century (Jakarta Post, 2019). United Nations Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change 
(IPCC) researchers predicted that if emissions remain unabated, the waterline―rising 
approximately 4 millimeters a year since 2006―could rise as much as 400 millimeters a year 
going into the 22nd century (Jakarta Post, 2019).  
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Erosion from increased Indonesian flooding has been responsible for the loss of an 
estimated 1,950 hectares of coastline annually, or 29,261 hectares lost to erosion in the past 
fifteen years, an area roughly the size of Jakarta (Straits Times, 2019). One of the erosion 
impacts due to local human activities includes clearing essential coastal mangrove forests to 
make room for milkfish ponds (Straits Times, 2019). Mangroves provide crucial protection 
against tsunamis, and they help to stabilize sediment and decrease the erosion of coastlines. By 
removing coastal forests, villages and cities alike are undermining the essential role mangroves 
play in the protection of coastlines. Disrupting the coastal landscape on a local level may create 
greater erosion impacts than even sea level rise (Straits Times, 2019). Along the coast of Central 
Java, where some of the worst abrasion in the country has been observed, three separate villages 
have sunk into the sea over the past 20 years. Experts identified the construction of ports and 
industrial projects along the coast as a cause of this catastrophe (Straits Times, 2019). With over 
80% of industrial locations situated in coastal areas, Indonesia stands to lose economically if the 
threats of sea level rise and erosion are not brought under control. As about 60 percent of the 
country’s population resides in coastal areas, Indonesia faces major humanitarian risks (Straits 
Times, 2019).  
Researchers now claim that a significant number of coastal cities in Java, Sumatra, and 
several other islands are at risk of chronic flooding by 2050 (Straits Times, 2019). Jakarta, the 
nation’s capital and home to 10 million people, faces a threat of sinking, in part due to sea level 
rise but also because of major urban planning problems. These urban planning strategies, or lack 
thereof, have contributed to the rapid rate at which Jakarta is sinking. Jakarta may be sinking 
faster than any other city in the world, with buildings being swallowed by the earth, and some 
coastal districts sinking as much as 14 feet in recent years (Kimmelman, 2017). About 40% of 
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Jakarta now lies below sea level, protected by only leaking seawalls. Jakarta’s water supply and 
infrastructure are part of the problem. Only a small number of Jakartans have access to reliable 
piped drinking water. Therefore, much of the public has resorted to digging illegal wells and 
draining the aquifers over which the city rests, essentially deflating the land on which they stand 
(Kimmelman, 2017). Environmental concerns, overcrowding, and the looming threat of major 
floods that will reach the city center, were issues cited by President Widodo in his decision to 
move the capital city from Jakarta to East Kalimantan. Projected rising sea levels may also affect 
East Kalimantan, for the CoastalDEM model shows that the city will also be at risk of major 
flooding by the year 2050 (Jakarta Post, 2019).  
Indonesia’s carbon-dense peatlands have the ability to make or break the country’s 
emissions reduction targets. As home to 36% of the world’s tropical peatlands, Indonesia is in a 
unique and dangerous position, for these highly-combustible ecosystems can emit massive 
amounts of GHG when burned, yet they are also one of nature’s most effective ways of taking 
atmospheric carbon and storing it underground (Jong, 2019, November 25). It’s estimated that 
Indonesia’s peatlands hold approximately 28 billion tons of carbon—the equivalent of three 
years’ worth of global emissions (Dunne, 2019). Peat consists of 90% water and 10% decaying 
organic matter. Peat stores 10 times more CO2 than other ecosystems within thick layers of this 
decaying plant material. Peatlands can be up to 60 feet deep, and in Indonesia it’s estimated that 
they store about 28.1 gigatons of CO2 (Liu, 2018; Jong, 2019, November 25).  
Peatlands are often in isolated locations and not policed well, making them attractive to 
expanding palm oil corporations. To clear land for plantations, peatlands must first be drained of 
their water, a process that in itself emits on average 55,000 tons of CO2 per hectare every year as 
the peat decomposes and the carbon is released into the atmosphere, roughly equivalent to 
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burning upwards of 6,000 gallons of gasoline (Jong, 2019, November 25). Norway has become 
the first country to ban palm oil by 2020 due to its high deforestation risk and emissions output. 
The emissions associated with producing a ton of palm oil grown on drained peatlands are 20 
times higher than the emissions produced from burning a ton of gasoline (Jong, 2019, November 
25). When drained, peatlands act as tinderboxes from natural causes such as a dry season or from 
intentional fires spiraling out of control. Once they start burning, peatlands are nearly impossible 
to put out (Liu, 2018). Rather than combusting above ground like typical fires, peatland fires 
smolder underground, producing smoke and air pollution much worse than that produced by 
typical burning biomass. This underground smoldering also makes the fires hard to detect and 
put out, for they don’t burn hot enough to be detected by satellites, and can quickly spread 
underground (Jong, 2019, November 25).  
In 1990, less than 2.5 million hectares of land in Indonesia was used for palm oil 
plantations. In 2008, the total forest covered by palm oil plantations, and hence the loss of 
natural forests, exceeded 25 million hectares (Singh, 2013). This number has continued to grow, 
and quickly. Deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia have also led to widespread loss 
of habitat within highly productive ecosystems. This loss means that Indonesia now has two 
threatened hotspots of global biodiversity, and some of the region’s wildlife faces an increased 
risk of extinction (Singh, 2013). As palm oil demand continues to increase, the financial 
incentives to continue clearing primary forests for plantations have strengthened (Singh, 2013).  
Aware of the major threats instigated by climate change, the Indonesian government has 
embarked on a mission to curb emissions and control deforestation, as will be discussed in the 
following section. Indonesia’s land and people suffer due to the government's failure to take 
substantive measures to decrease the country’s emissions. Although reform policies have been 
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developed and implemented, they have yet to reduce the country’s emissions, largely due to 
ambiguity and inconsistencies in the regulations themselves, as well as its weak government's 
capacity to enforce regulations. Resistance from powerful extractive industries have also 
hindered efforts to reduce deforestation, as conflicting motivations for forest resources continue 
to complicate the matter.  
 
Part 2: REDD+ Development in Indonesia 
 In light of the major long-term risks associated with continued global warming, Indonesia 
has begun implementing policies to curb further deforestation and manage the country’s 
emissions output. In 2007, Indonesia hosted the 13th session of the Conference of Parties (COP-
13), which took place in Bali. There, President Yudhoyono pledged that the Government of 
Indonesia (GoI) would design and implement carbon emissions reduction projects (Barr, 2007). 
Shortly after, the GoI established the Indonesian Forest Climate Alliance (IFCA) to begin the 
development of a REDD+ framework in the country (Ekawati, 2019). By May 2009, Indonesia 
became the first country to enact formal regulations as part of the administration of its new 
national REDD+ program. In September of 2009, President Yudhoyono committed to reducing 
emissions from LULUCF by 26% in 2020 from business-as-usual levels, and by 41% if given 
international aid (Holloway, 2009). This pledge was extended at the Paris Climate Conference in 
2016, along with a new intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) pledge of a 29-41% 
reduction in emissions by 2030 (Evans, 2015). If it could successfully adhere to REDD+ 
regulations, Indonesia had an opportunity to control high deforestation and degradation levels 
and reduce global climate change. However, Indonesia’s INDC emissions targets are vague on 
policy and financing needs, so this apparently straightforward pledge has been met with justified 
skepticism (Evans, 2015). 
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According to the UNFCCC, the REDD+ mechanism uses both market and non-market 
forces to provide economic incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions produced 
from forest deforestation and degradation. REDD+ also encourages these countries to enhance 
forest carbon stocks through investments in low-carbon development and sustainable forest 
management (Ekawati, 2019). For example, Indonesia could see significant revenue streams into 
the national treasury and rural communities through REDD+, promoting economic stability, 
poverty reduction, and development. One estimate is that a 5% reduction in Indonesia’s 
deforestation rate could generate annual REDD+ payments of USD $765 million, while a 30% 
reduction could generate more than $4.5 billion annually (Barr, 2007). Securing funds from 
REDD+ on a regular basis will be a challenge for Indonesia and other forest-rich countries 
because the payment system is entirely performance-based; payments will require Indonesia to 
reduce carbon emissions verifiably below an agreed national baseline. While all stakeholders are 
encouraged to take action in implementing these frameworks, there is no overarching body 
monitoring and demanding that any action take place (Ekawati, 2019).  
Given the large potential sums of money REDD+ activities support, countries receiving 
aid must have a robust system for financial management and governance to be successful. 
Without effective administration of funds, or the diversion of funds from their intended purpose, 
REDD+ objectives will be compromised, along with its ability to verifiably lower the country’s 
carbon emissions. Mismanagement of funds can then threaten the sustainability of future cash 
flows, as donor organizations are more likely to divert their funding to countries where REDD+ 
funds are managed according to a higher standard of financial accountability (Barr, 2007). 
Indonesia must therefore find ways to overcome internal corruption, a problem for many REDD+ 
nations. REDD+ administration faces an inherent contradiction, as many of the countries most 
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desperately in need of funding are also those with the longest history of mismanagement of 
public financial resources (Barr, 2007). According to a 2008 Transparency International report, 
of the 19 countries participating in the UN-REDD and the World Bank-sponsored Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF), 10 are ranked in the bottom third (as the most corrupt) of 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, based on surveys in 180 countries 
(Barr, 2007).  
There is a correlation between likely REDD+ recipients and weak financial governance 
and management. This relationship stems from the fact that institutional breakdowns and 
governance failures in both the forestry and financial sectors often play a role in facilitating and 
exacerbating the activities that REDD+ aims to reduce (Barr, 2007). If REDD+ only operates in 
countries with strong financial management and governance structures already in place, then 
some countries most in need of aid won’t be served. On the other hand, it becomes difficult to 
justify granting potentially hundreds of billions of dollars to the forestry sectors of these tropical 
countries if they are not able to slow deforestation due to ineffective management and the misuse 
of funds stemming from systematic corruption (Barr, 2007). Corruption in the forestry sectors of 
developing countries has been pervasive for decades, stemming from the abuse of power among 
all levels in this sector. Bribes and extortion are common ways to receive benefits in the form of 
concessions or licensing, and even modest regulations may not be enforced (Kartodihardjo, 
2015). As discussed in the following section, corruption has systematically destabilized 





Part 3: Corruption and Lack of Transparent Funding in Indonesia 
Lack of transparent funding was a key factor involved in the shortcomings following 
COP-13. This issue, still present today, began with Indonesia’s Reforestation Fund (RF). 
Established in 1989, the Fund was created to support reforestation and regeneration of degraded 
lands, and to ensure the country’s forests would be sustained long-term. Timber concessionaries 
finance the fund with a volume-based levy, where they are required to pay on every cubic meter 
of wood harvested from natural forests. By 2010, the Reforestation Fund had amassed aggregate 
receipts of approximately USD $5.8 billion, making it the commercial forestry sector’s largest 
source of government revenues (Barr, 2007). Since its inception, the GoI has used the 
Reforestation Fund to finance major public investments in reforestation and rehabilitation. 
However, in each case program outcomes have fallen well short of stated objectives. 
Implementation of successful reforestation strategies have been undermined by financial 
mismanagement and improper governance, issues that Indonesia continues to face today (Barr, 
2007).  
At the time of the Reforestation Fund’s inception, Indonesia’s second president, Suharto, 
was in power. He maintained a strong authoritarian rule from 1966 until 1998, when the growing 
pro-democracy movement forced him to resign. Suharto’s regime, which he coined the “New 
Order,” was defined by a strong political role for the military and the repression of adversaries 
(Barr, 2007). In Indonesia, the term New Order now embodies the regime practices of unbridled 
corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Indonesians use the acronym KKN (korupsi, kolusi, 
nepotisme) today to describe figures who upheld these authoritarian practices. Initially, the 
Reforestation Fund was controlled by the Ministry of Forestry (MoF), which exercised a high 
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level of discretion concerning how the funds were managed and to whom they would be 
allocated (Barr, 2007).  
Throughout the decade preceding the end of the Suharto era, the Ministry of Forestry 
used the Reforestation Fund to allocate more than USD $1 billion in cash grants and discounted 
loans to commercial plantation owners to promote development of industrial timber and 
pulpwood plantations (Barr, 2007). Due to inadequate mechanisms for oversight and 
accountability, a significant amount of Reforestation Fund capital was lost to fraud, diverted to 
other uses, and/or squandered on poorly managed plantations. For example, the Ministry 
distributed a significant amount of funds and conversion licenses to those companies with ties to 
the political elite, allowing a few well-connected figures to dominate sizable portions of the 
forest rent (Barr, 2007). Many of these actors fraudulently overstated their costs and the areas 
planted to receive funding above the levels to which they were entitled. Other actors used only 
small portions of their funding to actually manage the established plantation sites, causing the 
program to fall well short of its productivity target. The Ministry of Forestry distributed $600 
million to politically favored projects which had little if not nothing to do with the Reforestation 
Fund’s agenda of promoting reforestation and forest rehabilitation (Barr, 2007).  
In 1997, a major financial crisis gripped Southeast Asian countries, raising fears of a 
worldwide economic meltdown due to financial contagion. As the value of the rupiah declined 
significantly (from roughly 2,600 rupiah to 1 US dollar to 14,000 rupiah for each dollar), persons 
who had borrowed money in US dollars were hit hard. Suharto’s family members and associates 
had taken out huge loans from banks, which in turn borrowed significant sums of money from 
foreign banks. Amidst widespread rioting, Suharto was forced to resign, for the country had no 
way to pay back its $90 billion debt (Indonesia-Investments, 2010).  
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The International Monetary Fund then stepped in with a rescue package valued at USD 
$43 billion to stabilize the Indonesian currency, but it carried certain stipulations. One of these 
50 conditions was that the GoI commission a comprehensive third-party financial audit. The 
audit, conducted by Ernst & Young (E & Y) in 1999, documented systematic financial 
mismanagement, fraudulent practices by recipients of Reforestation funds, and routine diversion 
of funds for uses inconsistent with the Fund’s mandate. Ernst and Young documented USD $5.2 
billion in losses of public funds during the 5-year period spanning 1993 to 1998 (Barr, 2007).  
The GoI accepted the E & Y conclusions that major steps would have to be taken to 
improve administration of the Reforestation Fund and other New Order sources of state finance, 
including delegation of Reforestation Fund administrative power to the Ministry of Finance, 
which consolidated it within the state budget. The GoI endowed the Supreme Audit Board with 
the power to audit the Reforestation Fund and other public financial assets at any point (Barr, 
2007). The government also cracked down on corruption, prosecuting two high-profile cases 
involving the abuse of Reforestation Funds by some of Suharto’s close associates. The GoI 
created the Corruption Eradication Commission, which prosecuted several dozen cases involving 
senior officials (Barr, 2007). The GoI also created more equitable means of distributing the 
Reforestation Fund’s revenue, with 40 percent allotted to provincial and district governments, 
and 60 percent being administered by the national government. This period then came to be 
known as the Reformasi era (Barr, 2007).  
The fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime paved the way for a new era of Indonesian 
politics characterized by a more liberal socio-political environment, a desire for stronger 
democracy, and enhanced freedom of speech. This era spans into the present day, encompassing 
current president Widodo, who was democratically elected in 2014. Since the fall of the New 
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Order, the GoI has been challenged to overcome the deeply rooted political and governance 
problems that face the Reforestation Fund and other modes of state finance. Though promising 
reforms have been implemented, as discussed above, major challenges continue to impede 
rehabilitation and conservation efforts. Weak financial management and inefficient 
administration of revenues by all levels of government undermine the Fund’s ability to meet any 
of its stipulated goals, even with the new reforms (Barr, 2007).  
Without effective oversight measures to ensure reforms are followed accordingly, the GoI 
continues to lose millions of dollars in funding to fraudulent activities. Audits conducted by 
Indonesia’s Supreme Audit Board in 2009 document widespread Ministry of Forestry 
irregularities and weak internal controls in the distribution of Reforestation Funds. At both the 
national and regional level, the audits documented routine under-spending of funds budgeted for 
reforestation and rehabilitation projects, often by more than 50 percent, and planted areas falling 
short of designated targets. According to the audit, a single public service organization managing 
over USD $2.2 billion of the Fund’s capital failed to disperse a single dollar of the $500 million 
allocated for plantation development between 2008 and 2009 (Barr, 2007). These audits 
improved the transparency and accountability of funds in Indonesia, a goal that President 
Yudhoyono took to heart. However, given that the audits continue to show mismanagement of 
these funds, the GoI still has significant work to monitor, report, and verify adherence to 
program objectives.  
Widespread corruption in the post-Suharto era is still present, even after the creation of 
the Corruption Eradication Commission, though now it’s decentralized and therefore more 
difficult to quantify. As during the Suharto era, poor record-keeping and financial reporting 
makes determining the amount of money that reached its intended purpose hard to assess. The 
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GoI’s inability to manage forestry funds will be tested further as major funding from REDD+ 
schemes begin to appear. As such, transparency of funds, public accountability, and better 
financial management by agencies in all levels of government is of critical concern (Barr, 2007).  
 In 2009, Indonesia’s former president, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, stipulated 
a greenhouse gas emissions reduction goal of 26% by 2020, and up to a 41% reduction under the 
condition that developed countries provide finance or other forms of support, dependent on 
REDD+ (Holloway, 2009).  Indonesia enacted a number of laws to facilitate REDD+ around the 
time of Yudhoyono’s pledge, including Ministerial Decree P68/2008, which provided guidance 
on REDD+ pilot programs, and Ministerial Decree P30/2009, which outlined mechanisms for 
reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD Desk, 2013). As a member of the 
UN-REDD Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), both of which 
support national REDD+ planning and implementation strategies, Indonesia received USD $5.6 
million in funding in March of 2010. The funding was approved by the UN-REDD Programme 
policy board for the 2009 Indonesia National Programme, and its release from UN-REDD’s 
Multi-Partner Trust Fund marked the start of the program’s inception and implementation phase 
(REDD Desk, 2013). 
 
Part 4: The Oslo Pact 
In May 2010, the GoI signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) with the Norwegian government that 
Norway would pay Indonesia one billion USD to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation, 
forest degradation, and peatland conversion (Ekawati, 2019). Known as the Oslo Pact, the 
agreement states that the money will be transferred as long as deforestation rates, and by 
extension GHG emissions, decline in Indonesia after 2 years (Clements, 2010). Norway entered 
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this deal to enable it to reach zero emissions by 2050 through Indonesian offsets (Hermansen, 
2019). 
In the pact, Norway pledges to use the REDD+ framework to aid Indonesia in its capacity 
to monitor and protect its diminishing forests. Indonesia agreed to advance various forest-
conservation initiatives, including a two-year moratorium on any licensing for new logging or 
plantation concessions on peatlands and natural forests. The deal also required Indonesia to 
create a “degraded lands” database, which would direct any new development to carbon-poor 
areas in an effort to minimize emissions and conflicts with any existing landholders. Indonesia 
agreed to tackle illegal degradation and clearance of forests, create a transparent mechanism for 
funding its national REDD+ strategy, and implement a province-wide pilot program that yields 
verified reductions in carbon emissions (Edwards, 2012). The pact calls for the establishment of 
an independent MRV agency to track Indonesia’s progress towards reducing deforestation. This 
measure would afford greater transparency, an essential component for stronger governance, 
considering the fact that deforestation in Indonesia has been largely fueled by conversion permits 
of contested legality to firms controlled by local industrial-political elites (Clements, 2010).  
Although the initiatives outlined in the Oslo Pact have the potential to generate USD $5.6 
billion for Indonesia, conservationists have been hesitant to accept them with certainty 
(Clements, 2010). Based on Indonesia’s past track record of abuse of power and ineffective 
reforms, the promise of adhering to the many new projects outlined in the Oslo Pact has been 
met with skepticism. Indonesia’s inconsistent record in forest conservation is a major cause for 
concern, especially when so much is at stake, both financially and in terms of conservation. For 
example, the country failed to meet its 2007 promise to reduce forest fires, as human-induced 
fires increased by 59% from 2008 to 2009 (Clements, 2010). Moreover, just before the 2007 
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COP-13 session in Bali, President Yudhoyono announced a ban on the expansion of palm oil 
plantations onto peatlands. Yet, within two years, this ban was repealed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, allowing approximately 2 million hectares of peatlands to be cleared (Clements, 
2010). Why would authorities reverse the President’s decree after it was promulgated, especially 
when peat soils are traditionally regarded as being suboptimal for palm oil plantations to thrive? 
The timing of the repeal offers some clues to this question. It was 2009, and REDD+ was 
gaining momentum globally as a means of funding conservation. The next Conference of Parties 
would be held in December, where UNFCCC was expected to recognize avoided deforestation as 
a legitimate emissions reduction activity. A key criterion for valuing carbon stocks in a REDD+ 
project is “additionality,” the net emissions savings calculated based on a baseline deforestation 
and emissions scenario. This baseline scenario is what the emission levels would be if a 
business-as-usual approach was taken, as compared to the scenario in which REDD+ initiatives 
were followed (Clements, 2010). Therefore, any country working to maximize funding from 
REDD+ would be interested in registering a high “current” deforestation rate, preferably before 
the upcoming Conference of Parties, which is exactly what Indonesia did. Had those 2 million 
hectares not been cleared for development, Indonesia would essentially have defaulted on USD 
$3.2 - $13.2 billion worth of carbon derivatives from establishing REDD+ projects on those 
lands, based on a net present value of USD $1600-6600 per hectare (Koh, 2009). The repeal sets 
a precedent for other carbon-rich nations to exaggerate planned deforestation targets as a ploy to 
increase future financial benefits from REDD+ activities (Clements, 2010). 
Oslo Pact policies do not prevent land or forest degradation but increase it. Under the 
Pact, land slated for palm oil, rubber, and timber plantations will continue to be converted. In 
2009, the agriculture minister himself suggested that the 9.7 million hectares of land allocated to 
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palm oil plantations could double, and that at least 10 million hectares had already been allotted 
for industrial logging practices (Clements, 2010). Nevertheless, the Oslo Pact did create some 
impetus toward rainforest conservation. As the first of its kind, this international effort to save 
Indonesia’s imperiled forests is new, positive, and may inspire similar responses around the 
world. In an effort to afford greater transparency of where deforestation occurs and by whom, the 
Pact stipulates the establishment of an independent agency to track the country’s progress 
towards reducing deforestation (Clements, 2010). Indonesia agreed to create a degraded lands 
database to avoid past instances of even lightly logged forests being classified as degraded as a 
pretext to clear them. In creating this database, the Pact encourages the GoI to swap concessions 
for clearing old-growth forests to concessions for clearing degraded lands, which, if verifiably 
degraded, will lessen the emissions output generated from the clearing of forests (Clements, 
2010). However, if logged forests are included in this database, it would represent a severe blow 
for carbon conservation, for it would continue to allow lightly logged forests to be converted, 
instead of protected and conserved (Edwards, 2012). 
 The Oslo Pact seeks to involve all stakeholders in REDD+ decision making and 
implementation, including indigenous people and local communities (Clements, 2010). Only if 
local populations commit to protect their own lands from illegal logging and other means of 
deforestation are such efforts likely to succeed. However, Indonesia has yet to explore how local 
communities will share REDD+ funds, a key topic that the Pact aims to address through several 
provincial-level REDD+ pilot schemes.  
 After a year of delays, the Oslo Pact finally came into effect on May 20, 2011. Since 
then, Presidential Instruction (InPres) No. 10/2011, which outlines the two-year suspension on 
new licenses for clearing or logging peat and natural old-growth forest, has been extended four 
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times (Ekawati, 2019). A readiness grant for USD $3.6 million was signed in June 2011 to 
support the readiness process, determine reference emission levels, develop MRV infrastructure, 
and support capacity building between 2011 and 2013,  A few months later, as part of 
Presidential decree no. 25/2011, President Yudhoyono appointed a new REDD+ Task Force, 
responsible for establishing REDD+ financing mechanisms, the preparation of MRV institutions, 
and the effective implementation of the moratorium (REDD Desk, 2013).  
In September of 2012, after a year of extensive stakeholder consultation, the REDD+ 
Task Force launched its National REDD+ Strategy. The Strategy is focused on the foundations 
of REDD+ and its five pillars of:  
• Capacity: creating the capacity of all essential institutions; 
• Law: developing the necessary legal, enforcement, and regulatory frameworks; 
• Strategic projects: beginning with the ‘One Map’ project; 
• Multi-stakeholder participation; and 
• Paradigm shift: changing the assumptions, objectives, reference points, and techniques 
applied to the LULUCF sector in order to achieve low-emission and socially inclusive 
land use governance (Caldecott, 2013).  
As a non-binding document, the Strategy guides REDD+ in Indonesia. The National Strategy has 
since faced many implementation challenges. In response, Indonesia began to emphasize 
development of sub-national REDD+ strategies (STRADA) in 11 different provinces (Caldecott, 
2013).  
These sub-national STRADAs and action plans are developed by local REDD+ teams, 
composed of academics, officials, NGOs, and others appointed by the local government. Each 
province has a REDD+ coordinator from the central team in Jakarta to facilitate and inform the 
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process of implementing these local action plans (Caldecott, 2013). The Task Force’s first 
official pilot program was launched in Central Kalimantan. In its first evaluation report, the pilot 
program was described as containing “an abundance of issues typical to the country as a whole.” 
Some of these issues were mentioned in the report, including boundary disputes between sub-
districts, competition over land tenure, overlapping tenure systems and concession licenses, 
mining in Forest Estate areas, and other topics (Caldecott, 2013). Nevertheless, a STRADA was 
prepared for Central Kalimantan despite many conflicts of interest, and the province’s action 
plan was finished in 2013. The STRADA’s short-term objectives (2012-2014) were to 
implement the REDD+ Agency, reduce the rate of forest conversion, strengthen the recognition 
and mapping of land, and start the MRV system. In the medium term (2014-2020), the 
STRADA’s objectives were to promote environmentally friendly investments and to improve the 
status of land ownership and quality of governance. In the long term (2020-2030), the 
STRADA’s goals are to promote community-based forest management and peatland 
sustainability (Caldecott, 2013). These objectives align with those of the other 10 pilot provinces, 
as well as those of the entire nation. 
 
Part 5: Indonesia’s Moratorium on New Concession Licenses 
The initial priority of these sub-national REDD+ strategies is facilitating the achievement 
of short-term objectives through the design and implementation of a moratorium, intended to 
temporarily halt the issuance of new plantation permits in natural forests and peatlands. The 
content of this decree was arguably the most important indicator of whether business-as-usual 
practices were to be challenged in a meaningful way. The Presidential Task Force on REDD+ 
produced a detailed draft that covered a wide range of land protected under the moratorium. The 
Ministry of Forestry quietly drafted a second version of the decree and sent it to the President 
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directly for consideration. The content of this second draft sought to render the moratorium 
ineffective by reducing covered areas (Fay, 2018). After much debate between Task Force 
members and the MoF, the decree signed by the President was a compromise between these two 
drafts.  
In conflict with the agreements of the LoI, the moratorium does not include all natural 
forests, only those classified as old-growth, or primary. This allowed for tens of millions of 
hectares of secondary forests, a majority of them falling within indigenous territories, to be left 
open for new concessions (Fay, 2018). As both feared and expected, Indonesia permitted a rush 
of new concession licenses, spanning millions of hectares, to be approved on December 31, 
2010, one day before the LoI was originally scheduled to take effect (Clements, 2016). Exactly 
how much land was approved for new licensing is unknown, but estimates from the Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR) state that 9.6 million hectares of old-growth forests and 
5.8 million hectares of peatlands were licensed, for a total of 15.4 million hectares lost to 
development (Murdiyarso, 2011). In these ways, powerful industrial lobbyists prevented the 
moratorium’s potential to protect forests and in effect kept Indonesia’s business-as-usual 
practices.   
The Task Force was still committed to upholding the moratorium and thus reducing 
Indonesia’s deforestation rate despite the vast amount of land excluded. As the moratorium is a 
non-legislative document, there are no legal consequences to ministries or government agencies 
if the Presidential Instruction isn’t implemented or verified (Murdiyarso, 2011). The Presidential 
Instruction protects old growth forests and peatlands from conversion, but allows new licenses 
on so-called “degraded” lands, which encompass a vast amount of selectively logged dry forests, 
as they are not considered critical enough even though these dry forests and degraded lands 
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continue to sustain native biodiversity and substantial carbon stores (Edwards, 2012). Dry forests 
and degraded lands may have a lower capacity to sequestrate carbon versus peatlands and ancient 
forests, but when put into perspective in terms of scale, they account for vast amounts of carbon 
storage.  
Because of the lack of protective measures that the moratorium placed on dry and 
selectively logged forests, the area of land actually protected is significantly smaller than its 
potential coverage. The area of degraded forest that can be designated for new concessions 
dwarfs the lands protected under the Presidential Instruction―it is 15 times the size of Belgium 
and 46.7 million ha (Edwards, 2012). Of 66.4 million ha of forest cover included in the 
moratorium map, only about 26%, or 11.3 million ha, are actually protected when taking into 
account the moratorium’s exceptions and those forest concessions already previously protected 
(Enrici, 2016). Existing conservation areas encompass 47.8 million hectares of forest. After 
subtracting the newly licensed areas, the moratorium protects just 22.5 million ha of forest and 
7.2 million ha defined as old-growth forest. The total area of forest protected under the 
moratorium is therefore less than half of the area of logged forest that remains wholly 
unprotected (Edwards, 2012). Ultimately, at least 29% of the nation’s peatlands and 21% of its 
remaining primary forests were excluded from the map and thus open for conversion. When 
considering the fact that 63.8% of the area covered was already designated as conservation or 
protection forest areas, and another 19% is geographically or legally protected, the moratorium 
only newly protects 17.2% of the land it covers (Enrici, 2016). By structuring the moratorium’s 
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design in such a way to include areas already protected, the ban appears to afford far greater 
forest protection measures than it actually does (see Fig. 2.2).  
Figure 2.2: Venn Diagram of the Moratorium Map Superimposed on Forest Types 
         Source: Murdiyarso, 2011 
 
 
In contrast to the forested areas protected or not based on their classification as ‘primary,’ 
‘natural,’ ‘old-growth,’ or ‘degraded,’ the text on peatlands implies that the moratorium protects 
all peatlands deeper than 50 cm, regardless of their type, location, jurisdiction, or level of 
disturbance (Edwards, 2012). Indonesia’s peatlands cover a combined 20.2 Mha, distributed 
mostly across the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Papua, estimated to store more than 30 
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billion tons of carbon (Murdiyarso, 2011). The Presidential Instruction protects 11.2 million 
hectares of deep peatlands, 2.6 Mha of which are primary peatlands, and 8.6 Mha of which are 
logged peatlands (Edwards, 2012). This excludes the country’s remaining 5.8 Mha, presumably 
because of existing permits or because the land is expected to be used for future activities related 
to energy and food security (see Fig. 2.2) (Murdiyarso, 2011). Much of this land is both 
physically accessible and at great threat of conversion, therefore its protection represents a 
significant victory in terms of both carbon and biodiversity conservation (Edwards, 2012). 
However, of the 11.2 Mha protected under the moratorium, only 4.2 Mha of the peat remains 
under primary forest cover. This is important because non-forested peatlands, which comprise a 
total of 9.5 Mha (both under the moratorium and not), are at the greatest risk of further 
degradation from forest fires and the alteration of water regimes. Indonesia would benefit 
substantially, in terms of carbon stores, by enforcing the protection of all peatlands, regardless of 
existing licenses or potential future uses. Forests growing on peatlands and non-forested 
peatlands have the highest destruction rates and their conversion into plantations could cause 
CO2 emissions to be as high as 60 tons/ha/year. Even after conversion, peatlands continue to 
emit greenhouse gases (Murdiyarso, 2011). 
 Stakeholders who earn their livelihoods from forest conversion have challenged the 
moratorium, arguing that it could disrupt palm oil and other crops’ expansion programs, thereby 
threatening the job security of many local residents. To assess the validity of this claim, 
Indonesia assures that all variables be considered, including the rise of new job opportunities as 
REDD+ becomes implemented. For example, large palm oil companies, which had been 
expanding at an average rate of 10,000 ha per company per year, are expected to have sufficient 
land permits granted or approved-in-principle to continue expanding at those rates even beyond 
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the length of the 2-year moratorium (Murdiyarso, 2011). In this case, the moratorium would have 
little impact on employment associated with expansion. 
The massive amount of land that has thus far been accessible to palm oil producers has 
reduced production efficiency, as developers choose to continue expanding as opposed to 
intensifying production from existing estates. These practices have meant that Indonesia’s 
productivity per unit area of palm oil plantation has fallen well short of its potential. Average 
palm oil productivity for the nation is 3.5 tons per ha, 40% less than Malaysia’s average of 6.4 
tons per ha (Murdiyarso, 2011). This discrepancy provides room for improvement. In working to 
improve yield production, developers could also explore means of enhancing infrastructure. This 
in itself would provide jobs and generate income for local communities. Another potential new 
option for companies that have already acquired degraded peat forests is to apply for new 
licenses for ecosystem restoration. While aboveground carbon stores on these degraded lands 
may be low, there is a high likelihood that the ground below still holds significant carbon stocks. 
Depending on the economic viability of this strategy, the restoration of degraded lands has the 
potential to attract investments from the private sector (Murdiyarso, 2011).  
 Indonesia never considered the two-year moratorium on new concession licenses as an 
end in itself, but rather a means of achieving better forest governance for the long term. The 
moratorium can essentially be viewed as a trial phase for Indonesia, where necessary 
coordination processes, data collection, and new regulations could be tested and improved upon. 
As the moratorium was so limited in its scope and lifespan, one of its most important benefits is 
that it forced relevant ministries and agencies to communicate regularly and transparently both 
amongst themselves and with the public. A significant step towards achieving greater 
transparency came with the Ministry of Forestry’s release of 2009 land cover data, followed by 
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its release of the Indicative Moratorium Map (IMM) for public review in 2011. The InPres calls 
for the revision of the IMM every six months in order to review the progress and impediments of 
the moratorium policies and their implementation (Murdiyarso, 2011). This regular revision 
allows Indonesia to improve forest governance, as it allows for the possibility of reviewing 
existing concession licenses and better spatial planning strategies, which could eventually change 
the size and the permanence of the area secured under the moratorium. By reviewing approved-
in-principle licenses and the renewal of existing licenses for their environmental integrity (ie. 
carbon and biodiversity richness), the Ministry of Forestry has the ability to expand the 
moratorium to cover more critical lands in the country, and to revoke licenses for non-compliant 
or poorly performing operations (Murdiyarso, 2011).  
Given the size, scope, diversity, and geographic scale of Indonesian land, a continuing 
challenge is coordination among central and regional governments in interpreting 
decentralization laws and engaging multiple government agencies and stakeholders at once. For 
example, coordination for future REDD+ implementation under the moratorium serves to 
establish the enabling conditions necessary to improve low carbon development strategies under 
REDD+. The moratorium could pave the way for successful policy reform far beyond its 2-year 
lifetime if stakeholders accept opportunities to improve the moratorium’s effectiveness, such as 
use of spatially explicit land cover information from the Ministry of Forestry. The Ministry did 
release the IMM for public review. Other steps could include the release of complete and 
accurate license information, forest designation maps, and land use maps (Murdiyarso, 2011).  
Though imperfect, the 2009 moratorium on new logging concessions did promote 
Indonesian forest conservation. In 2013, the second evaluation of the Indonesia-Norway REDD+ 
Partnership deliverables found that there had been substantial progress in establishing 
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arrangements needed for beneficial reforms to governance of the LULUCF sector in Indonesia. 
The evaluation of Phase 1 REDD+ deliverables reported that all deliverables had either been 
accomplished or were in the process of being accomplished. For example, InPres 10/2011 was 
replaced and extended to May 2015 by Presidential Instruction 6/2013. The IMM published a 
fourth revision of its public map of all forests and concessions. Presidential Regulation 62/2013 
established a legal basis for a national REDD+ Agency to facilitate REDD+ processes; 
coordinate REDD+ actors; develop advanced MRV systems and REDD+ financing systems; 
implement the moratorium; and close moratorium loopholes (Caldecott, 2013).  
 
Part 6: Indonesia’s National REDD+ Agency 
President Yudhoyono’s creation of a national REDD+ Agency in 2013 was significant, as 
it became the first cabinet-level government institution in the world with a role to prevent land-
based CO2 emissions (Fay, 2018). As agreed in the original LoI between Norway and Indonesia, 
this REDD+ Agency had five main features: its leader should report directly to the president; it 
should be cross-sectional; it should have ministerial-level leadership; it should be the Designated 
National Authority (in UNFCCC terms); and it should have the authority and power to influence 
events, rather than just coordinate stakeholders (Caldecott, 2013). In effect, the Agency’s 
mandate is to help the president coordinate, supervise, facilitate, manage, and control REDD+ in 
Indonesia. Over the next two years, the Agency strengthened, expanding relationships previously 
established by the Presidential Task Force. The Agency served as a network for land and forest 
management reform, attracting partnerships with institutions both locally and abroad (Fay, 
2018). 
The REDD+ Agency developed strategies to address Indonesia’s land-based emissions 
under its “Beyond Carbon” program that defined the Agency’s REDD+ National Strategy. The 
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program sought to: aid in sustainable landscape management; enable sustainable economic 
systems for land utilization; empower local economies; and mainstream development reforms 
(Fay, 2018). The Beyond Carbon program developed an inventory of licenses for conversion and 
legal challenges to the original distribution of those licenses. It addressed extensive tenure 
conflicts between local communities and extractive industries that arise from distributing 
conversion licenses in lands considered indigenous territories (Fay, 2018). To resolve the 
complex problem of overlapping land use licenses issued by various ministries and local 
governments, the Agency promoted a “One Map Policy” (OMP) and a single integrated database 
to manage all information related to natural forests, forest lands, indigenous communities, 
mining, palm oil plantations, and other land-use licenses (Fay, 2018). The accumulation and 
synchronization of all this information was not completed in President Yudhoyono’s 
administration. Subsequently the Widodo administration sought to accelerate the OMP’s 
delivery.  
The REDD+ Agency’s Beyond Carbon strategy faced many implementation challenges, 
such as integrating programs into district level planning. Competition among government 
agencies and resistance from plantation conglomerates slowed the forest governance process, 
resulting in delays that would place the government’s effort to meet its GHG reductions 
commitment far behind schedule (Fay, 2018). These ongoing challenges and strong push-back 
from elites demonstrate that even with an Agency that can propose new legislation, Indonesia’s 
forest governance could remain stagnant until these fundamental obstacles are overcome. 
When Joko Widodo was elected as president in 2014, his election signaled a shift away 
from elite control of the political system and towards a leadership committed to addressing 
inequities, weak government services, and corruption (Fay, 2018). Although his administration 
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was perceived as pro-business, he committed to sustainable forest management and improving 
the welfare and productive capacity of local people, thus emulating what was called a “green 
economy.” One of Widodo’s first actions as president was to combine the Environment and 
Forestry ministries to become the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF). He 
incorporated all land-use and climate related agencies, including the REDD+ Agency into one 
ministerial body, the National Climate Change Council (DNPI), creating one broad Climate 
Change Directorate in 2015 (Fay, 2018) The merger was presented as a way to improve forest 
management with environmental protection and deal with corruption while improving efficiency. 
His new arrangement was technically in breach of the LoI and was therefore opposed by the 
Agency’s leadership and other activists, including key donors. Moreover, environmental NGOs 
expressed concerns that in merging the environmental and forestry ministries, environmental 
concerns would become marginalized and lose momentum (Anderson, 2016). Since the merger, 
progress in the REDD+ agenda has become more difficult, as the REDD+ Agency and its 
programs are now managed from a lower administrative level within the MoEF, as opposed to its 
own independent agency (Fay, 2018).  
 
Part 7: Phases of REDD+ Implementation in Indonesia 
The moratorium in place represents a key deliverable of Phase 1 and step towards the 
start of Phase 2, where transformation of managerial systems in the LULUCF sector are slated to 
take place. With only limited oversight from the REDD+ Agency that was intended to facilitate 
all REDD+ action plans, analysts report that the moratorium has been ineffective at reducing 
deforestation (Caldecott, 2013). A UNDP participatory assessment of forest and REDD+ 
governance, conducted from 2011 to 2013, gave ten provinces a composite score of only 2.35 out 
of 5, based on separate assessments for transparency, participation, equity, capacity, 
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accountability, and effectiveness (Caldecott, 2013). NGOs in provinces such as Central 
Kalimantan reported that licenses for new concessions were still being issued in the moratorium 
area, a fact confirmed by the Governor of Central Kalimantan in 2013. The Governor also 
confirmed that licenses for degraded/deforested lands were not being revoked, apparently to 
allow companies to maintain their presence on the ground and thereby continue buying logs 
illegally from local people (Caldecott, 2013). 
Once all six Phase 1 deliverables were established (a National REDD+ Strategy; selection 
of a pilot province; the moratorium; a REDD+ Agency; an MRV institution; and a financing 
mechanism), Indonesia was ready to enter Phase 2 of REDD+. Phase 2 involves implementation 
of national policies, measures, strategies, or action plans for further capacity building, 
technology development and transfer, and results-based demonstration activities, which would 
then evolve into results-based actions (Phase 3) (REDD Desk, 2013). Indonesia has not 
publicized when exactly it entered into Phase 2 of REDD+, as given the decentralized nature of 
regional projects, they operate along different timelines. Indonesia also continues to modify 
Phase 1 outcomes, such as the MRV institution, clouding the exact transition between Phase 1 
and 2.   
Phase 3, however, is marked by a decisive turning point: it begins when the changes to 
national legislation implemented in Phases 1 and 2 reduce deforestation, stimulating the pay-out 
of funds based on reduced emissions. For Indonesia, this transition into the final REDD+ phase 
was delayed by a long list of issues, from not enforcing new regulations, to permitting illegal 
logging, the expansion of palm oil farms, and even catastrophic forest fires. In 2017, Indonesia 
was finally able to reduce its rate of deforestation. After verification from the Norwegian 
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Government in 2019, Indonesia is finally set to receive the first part of the billion-dollar 
Norwegian pledge.  
While some analysts praise the GoI’s entry into REDD+ Phase 3, other analysts remain 
only ‘cautiously optimistic.’ Indonesia did reduce its carbon emissions in 2017, but only by 4.8 
million tons (Jong, 2019, February 20). This reduction is the equivalent of preventing the 
deforestation of 38 square miles of forest, assuming that one hectare of forest holds an average of 
132 tons of CO2. This small forest area saved can be viewed as the culmination of tremendous 
effort over more than a decade.  
Debate over the valuation for each ton of CO2 reduced has extended Indonesia’s pay-out 
date. Indonesia advocated for a higher valuation than what Brazil earned under its own deal with 
Norway, stating that people’s livelihoods need to be compensated now that they can’t use the 
forest for survival. If Indonesia were to receive payments equivalent to those of Brazil (at $5 for 
each ton of CO2), Indonesia would receive approximately $24 million from Norway for its 2017 
efforts, an amount deemed too low to accept at this point (Jong, 2019, February 20).  
Why was the area of tropical forest saved from conversion in 2017 so small, and why did 
it take so long to accomplish? According to one analyst, the answer lies with uncertainty, 
ineffective policies, inadequate enforcement of regulations, and Indonesia's lack of coordination 
across all levels of government (Ekawati, 2019). These critical issues have undermined 
Indonesia’s ability to meet its conservation targets since Yudhoyono’s 2007 pledge to decrease 
emissions. The following section will focus on barriers Indonesia faces for achieving its REDD+ 
objectives, and how these challenges have manifested themselves in the country’s policies, 
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Part 1: Weak Forest Governance 
Weak forest governance is ubiquitous in Indonesia, reflecting a history of problematic 
governance since the Suharto regime and its subsequent decentralization. Confusing regulations, 
weak institutional capacity, corruption, overlapping authority, and insufficient sanctions for 
violations all result from this weak governance (Enrici, 2016). These challenges have meant that 
Indonesian deforestation occurs both in designated production forests and areas recognized and 
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protected by the MoF. Between 2000 and 2012, 40% of primary forest loss occurred in areas that 
prohibited clearing. According to estimates from the MoF, during those same years 13% of the 
total deforestation took place in conservation and protection forests (Enrici, 2016).  
Lack of coordination among different levels of government (i.e. district, regional, and 
national) creates ambiguity regarding which regulations to follow, as national and regional goals 
for forest management and land use may conflict with each other. Confusing regulations due to 
this ambiguity can exacerbate weak governance, leading to discrepancies between nationally 
stipulated forest management goals and what occurs in reality. For example, the national 
government may designate an area of forest as protected. Regional governments still have the 
authority to issue licenses for operating within those areas, which then leads to clearing and 
degradation in protected areas (Enrici, 2016). Furthermore, protected areas may be designated at 
the national level, but enforcing the protection of these areas falls to local authorities. These 
authorities could receive bribes from companies or individuals wanting to operate within a 
specific protected area, leading to forest damage. Preventing encroachment into forested areas is 
problematic even when an area is designated as a conservation area, REDD+ activity site, or 
national park (Enrici, 2016).  
Conservation areas and REDD+ sites are vulnerable to encroachment from palm oil, 
mining, and logging, to which authorities often turn a ‘blind eye’ due to lack of incentives and 
capacity to deter. Encroachment occurs when agricultural lands border protected areas or 
REDD+ projects, and in some instances local authorities take no action to stop it. Encroachment 
may start out small, but if authorities do not have the capacity to force out exploitative activities, 
it can spread to cover thousands of hectares, as has been the case in a number of National Parks 
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and REDD+ projects (Enrici, 2016). Indonesia’s inability to control encroachment, even in its 
protected areas, poses a huge barrier to its ability to meet environmental protection goals.  
Indonesia’s inability to deter encroachment is aligned with its failure to control 
widespread corruption. During the Suharto regime the GoI created a Reforestation Fund (RF) to 
aid in reforestation and forest rehabilitation, yet instead it was used as a front to transfer funds to 
powerful political actors and firms. Today, that same RF is one of the government’s key tools for 
achieving its pledge to reduce emissions by 29% by 2030. When President Widodo took office in 
2014, his administration agreed that an area the size of the UK was critical for reforestation. The 
area of land actually reforested since then has been negligible, amounting to fewer than 390 
square miles between 2015 and 2018, less than half of one percent of the initial target (Jong, 
2019, January 25). As of 2019, President Widodo has tripled the land rehabilitation program’s 
funding. The Ministry of Environment has set a goal of restoring 800 square miles of critical 
land annually. To meet the country’s emissions reduction target by 2030, the pace of 
reforestation must be far greater, at least 3,000 square miles a year (Jong, 2019, January 25).  
President Widodo increased the program’s funding because lack of funding was cited as 
the main impediment to reforestation (Jong, 2019, January 25). However, the RF, amounting to 
$340 million as of the end of 2018, has gone untapped for years. Government officials are 
reluctant to use cash from the RF due to its history of mismanagement under the Suharto 
administration, wherein many officials were implicated in cases of malfeasance. Fear of being 
accused of corruption has led officials to steer clear of the fund, leading to vast areas of critical 
land going unrestored (Jong, 2019, January 25). Indonesia’s struggle with corruption runs deep, 
and this is just one example of how difficult it has been to overcome, both in government action 
and in civilian perception of the government and political elites. Nonetheless, if Indonesia wants 
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to achieve its emissions reduction goal, the chronic obstacle of corruption must be faced head 
on.  
Illegal logging has been another pervasive barrier to forest conservation initiatives in 
Indonesia. Back in 2010, when the LoI was signed, Norway gave estimates claiming that illegal 
logging contributed to an annual loss of USD $2 billion in revenues, taxes, and duties 
(Permitting Crime, 2015). The Human Rights Watch gave a different estimate in 2013, claiming 
that between 2007 and 2011, USD $7 billion was lost to corruption within the forestry sector and 
illegal logging activities (Enrici, 2016).  To deter this problem, the REDD+ program was 
expected to establish a special unit to tackle illegal logging, and to enforce existing laws against 
it, along with laws against trading timber and related forest crimes. After two years of 
investigations into the palm oil sector in Indonesia, the Environmental Investigation Agency 
(EIA) published a report in 2015 documenting systematic criminality driving forest conversion, 
which reports that “the unprecedented growth of plantations has been characterized by illegality” 
and that “successive attempts to bring some semblance of order…. have been undermined by a 
combination of corruption and incompetence, resulting in the exploitation of forest dwellers and 
driving rates of deforestation to the highest in the world” (Permitting Crime, 2014). 
The report describes a surge in timber production in the Central Kalimantan province, 
supposedly from logging concessions (which had not been increased), but actually from new 
permits for palm oil expansion. This timing suggests that the increase in timber was more likely 
from unlicensed and mis-declared timber from plantation expansion than from logging 
concessions. This timing coincided with the first direct elections of local regents, providing a 
clear link between the surge of palm oil concessions, a corrupt regent, and a high-profile political 
graft case (Permitting Crime, 2014). REDD+ has failed to address this illegality and corruption 
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through its reforms, which has allowed the ongoing destruction of Central Kalimantan’s forests. 
The EIA’s report concludes that even with the raft of policy developments created under 
REDD+, Indonesia’s forests remain “wide open for conversion,” and that the spatial plans used 
to govern forest and land use in effect provide a legal basis for companies to continue destroying 
forests for years to come (Permitting Crime, 2014). 
Because corruption in Indonesia reaches into the top levels of central and regional 
government, as well as across ministries, its eradication is difficult. Although reforms have been 
put in place to increase transparency and accountability, the GoI’s attempts to halt corruption 
through the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has been described by different actors as 
both successful and weak (Enrici, 2016). In a 2013 report conducted by the KPK, it found that 
the MoF was responsible for inaccurately mapping forest cover, land use, concessions, and 
unfairly allocating land rights. While the KPK has had a number of successes related to forest 
governance reforms, those who describe it as weak claim that the KPK has faltered in its power 
to prosecute high ranking individuals (Enrici, 2016). One example from 2019 of the persistent 
lack of transparency in Indonesia’s forest management is the MoF’s decision to withhold data on 
right-to-cultivate permits for agriculture, known as HGU permits. Each permit contains details 
such as land boundaries, coordinates and the area of the concession, as well as the leaseholder’s 
name. HGU permits deter land-grabbing, an issue commonly seen when companies lay claim to 
community lands without having to show their concession maps (Jong, 2019, February 20). By 
withholding data, the MoF creates ambiguity about forest boundaries and ownership, a critical 
issue surrounding Indonesia’s weak forest governance. 
Lack of sanctions for those who violate regulations is yet another factor contributing to 
Indonesia’s inability to deter corruption. Legal sanctions for these violators are nonexistent or 
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too weak to support enforcement (Enrici, 2016). Even in some cases when there are indisputable 
infringements of licensing regulations, authorities have initially retracted the holders’ licenses, 
only to reissue them at a later date (Indrarto, 2012). Sanctions are not only scarce, but they are 
also difficult to enforce, due to lack of clarity about who has the power to invoke them. This 
ambiguity can be seen in the fact that the MoF is responsible for all official forest land but has no 
capacity to enforce sanctions on any permits issued by another sector (Enrici, 2016). Due to the 
various limitations outlined above, Indonesia’s MoF does not have the institutional capacity to 
fully manage and protect its forests.  
 
Part 2: Moratorium Loopholes and Ambiguity 
In addition to Indonesia’s many REDD+ implementation barriers, the moratorium itself 
faces certain constraints. The wording and content of the 2011 moratorium can be confusing and 
regulations can be circumvented. In the first three months after the moratorium was issued, over 
100 cases of deforestation were recorded in non-concessioned moratorium areas. As recently as 
2011, there were no sanctions developed in accordance with the moratorium (Enrici, 2016).  
The ambiguity of the moratorium arises from Indonesia’s history of forest classification. 
The legal designation of land as “official forest” does not necessarily depend on whether or not 
that land has forest cover, leading to a dichotomy of forested areas that can be classified as either 
“institutionally recognized” (IR), “non-institutionally recognized” (NIR) or non-forested areas 
that are institutionally recognized as official forests (see Table 3.2) (Enrici, 2016). To be IR, the 
lands must be designated by the GoI as being under the authority of the MoF. Indonesia 
classifies official forests based on their intended function, with the three main categories of 
protection forest, conservation forest, and production forest. Production forests are then 
separated based on their categorization as regular production forest, convertible production 
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forest, and limited production forest (Enrici, 2016). Land that falls outside the jurisdiction of the 
MoF is considered land for other uses (APL), and is not officially recognized as forest, even if it 
has actual forest cover (Enrici, 2016). This complex classification system is part of a larger trend 
of confusing forest management regulations in Indonesia, serving to exacerbate already weak 
institutional capacity and opportunities for corruption that result in the mismanagement of 
resources.   
Table 3.2: Indonesia’s Forest Classification System 
 
Source: Enrici, 2016 
 
 
The designation of a forest as institutionally recognized can potentially offer an area 
some degree of protection from deforestation and degradation, although in a number of cases, 
protected and conserved forests have been left vulnerable. Nevertheless, non-institutionally 
recognized forest, or land with forest cover designated as land for other use (APL), is more 
susceptible to destruction, as evidenced by high rates of deforestation documented in these areas 
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(see Table 3.2). A study conducted in Sumatra found that deforestation in official forest land 
from 1990 to 2010 ranged from 24 to 29%. Primary forest that was designated as APL 
experienced a 96% loss in forest cover (Enrici, 2016). Non-institutionally recognized forest areas 
are intended for “other uses,” making it easier to obtain licenses in these areas and thereby 
leaving them more vulnerable to conversion. As of 2013, MoF data indicates that approximately 
8% of Indonesia’s forest cover is designated as APL and therefore highly susceptible to 
conversion. In response to recent forest-related initiatives, there have been reports of official 
forest being converted to APL, thus making it easier for concessionaires to obtain licenses and 
exploit these lands no longer under the authority of the MoF (Enrici, 2016).   
The existence of non-institutionally recognized forests further complicates matters of 
transparency, accountability, and the reporting of forest cover loss figures. The conflicting forest 
classifications have led to different deforestation rates from the MoF versus those from other 
sources. For example, in 2013, the MoF reported 124 million ha of official forest. Satellite data 
showed only 92.4 million ha of forest cover (Enrici, 2016). Examples of conflicting data can also 
be seen among the country’s government institutions. For example, in 2012, the MoE 
documented 59.8 million ha of forest cover in Papua, but the MoF only identified 44.2 million ha 
(Enrici. 2016). Inconsistencies about which forests are considered official are further heightened 
by the use of different satellite imaging data and discrepancies over the definition of the word 
“forest.” The MoF’s definition of forest is “a specific territory determined and or decided by the 
government as a permanent forest,” which is different from the FAO’s definition (Enrici, 2016). 
These discrepancies over how to define what constitutes a forest is yet another example of the 
unnecessarily complex and confusing forest management practices taking part in Indonesia.  
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Although the moratorium represents an effort on part of the Indonesian government to 
curb emissions and reform forest governance, the forestry, palm oil, and mining industries 
lobbied heavily throughout the design phase of the Presidential Instruction to allow for sufficient 
loopholes so as to not meaningfully challenge the status quo (Fay, 2018). One way in which this 
manifested was through the conversion of institutionally recognized lands into APL, which as 
mentioned, are much more vulnerable to land-use change (Enrici, 2016). Evidence of this can be 
seen at both the national and sub-national level. In one case, 11 days after the moratorium was 
implemented, a Ministerial Decree called for the conversion of 11.2 million ha of official forest 
in the REDD+ pilot program of Central Kalimantan to non-institutionally recognized forest 
(APL) (Murdiyarso, 2011). Another example of this conversion taking place occurred in Kapuas 
Hulu, an area designated officially as a conservation forest with two large national parks. In 
2013, evidence of approximately 5% of official forest estate in Kapuas Hulu being converted to 
land for other uses (APL) was recorded (Enrici, 2016). By way of decreasing the amount of land 
officially protected under the moratorium, stakeholders involved have benefitted by gaining easy 
access to lands newly available for conversion, regardless of whether they are considered 
primary forests or degraded.  
The moratorium faces other criticisms regarding its ability to afford substantial protection 
to critical lands. One of these concerns with the moratorium is that much of the old-growth 
forests protected under the Instruction are in steep and inaccessible mountainous areas that are 
already unlikely to face much threat from human incursion. As mentioned previously, REDD+ 
payments must have ‘additionality’ by slowing imminent forest destruction and protecting 
carbon stocks that are currently threatened. However, it is the most imperiled forests―those 
surviving in the lowlands of Borneo and Sumatra―that are largely excluded from the 
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moratorium due to the fact that they have already been licensed and selectively logged (Edwards, 
2012). These flat and easily accessible lands are vulnerable to conversion. Not including them in 
the moratorium could well subvert the additionality requirement for REDD+ payments and 
undermine the pilot project’s ability to achieve verified reductions in carbon emissions 
(Edwards, 2012). Indonesia has the opportunity to expand agriculture onto abandoned lands that 
naturally lack forests, such as the vast Imperata grasslands (Edwards, 2012). In creating the 
degraded lands database, REDD+ conservationists aim to funnel agricultural practices onto lands 
such as these, but they must take care to precisely define what “degraded” entails, otherwise risk 
converting lands that have been hardly touched into plantations.    
Another moratorium loophole is that existing permits for logging and agricultural 
operations in old-growth forests and peatlands can be extended. Clearing of these ultra-carbon-
rich lands for the purpose of sugarcane production was not banned under the Presidential 
Instruction, even though it is one of the most rapidly expanding biofuel crops. Over the decade of 
1998 to 2008, sugarcane agriculture increased in area by 26% globally, and by 76% in the 
World’s Megadiverse Countries (those 17 countries that harbor the majority of Earth’s species). 
Any expansion of sugarcane production in Indonesia would have severe consequences for its 
carbon emission levels. One analyst reported that clearance of old-growth forests for biofuel 
crops takes between 75 and 93 years to offset the lost carbon, while over 600 years are needed to 
offset deep peatland conversion (Edwards, 2012). Nevertheless, since 2006, the GoI has 
promoted the use of biofuels to decrease GHG emissions and increase energy security and job 
creation. The country’s National Energy Policy called for biofuels to make up 15% of the 
country’s energy mix by 2025, which has led to more land being allocated for biofuel 
development. This has worked to increase pressure on forested areas by stimulating the demand 
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for agricultural lands, thus conflicting with the country’s REDD+ Strategy and other “green” 
policy objectives (Anderson, 2016). 
 Loopholes and critical issues with the moratorium are rooted in Indonesia’s political, 
bureaucratic, and financial obstacles, as well as palm oil interests and the timber industry 
(Ekawati, 2019). Ambiguous terminology surrounding how forests are defined has left the 
moratorium open to interpretation and can be problematic for the enforcement of regulations 
(Enrici, 2016). One issue is the definition of the term ‘primary’ forests. As defined by the United 
Nations FAO, a ‘primary forest’ is a naturally regenerated forest of native tree species, in which 
there are no clearly visible indications of human activity and ecological processes are not 
significantly disturbed (Murdiyarso, 2011). In contrast, the MoF used the term ‘primary natural 
forest’ in the moratorium for the first time in Indonesian forestry policy, without clearly defining 
it. Although there is still no universally agreed upon definition for this term, the MoF has defined 
it to mean that ‘no license applying to the area had ever been issued’ (Murdiyarso, 2011).  
The InPres introduced this new terminology in contrast to the term ‘natural forest’ used 
previously in the LoI, and it has been interpreted differently by various stakeholders. The use of 
‘primary’ in the terminology enforces the conception that the moratorium includes only 
untouched, unmanaged, and undisturbed forests, which encompasses far less than what was 
interpreted under the original LoI (Murdiyarso, 2011). By design, the terminology used in the 
Presidential Instruction excluded disturbed, or ‘secondary’ natural forests. This difference in 
interpretation has huge implications, as a broader definition would more than double the area 
protected under the moratorium. Secondary forests have larger carbon stocks than both palm oil 
and fiber plantations, and in most cases, they support higher biodiversity levels. Thus, failure to 
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protect these secondary forests represents a lost opportunity to protect another 46.7 Mha of 
forests rich in carbon and biodiversity (Murdiyarso, 2011).  
Another contested issue with the moratorium is that it sets out four exceptions to its 
provisions, three of which have the potential to undermine carbon emission reduction targets. 
Depending on how extensively the following license exceptions are awarded, the effectiveness of 
the moratorium could be retarded. The first exception is for any lands covered by applications for 
concessions licenses already ‘approved in principle’ by the MoF, regardless of their richness in 
carbon, biodiversity, or other ecosystem services (Murdiyarso, 2011). The exclusion of these 
licenses led to approximately 3.6 million hectares of primary forest and peatland being left out of 
the moratorium, an amount equivalent to 7.6% of the original moratorium area (Enrici, 2016). 
The second exception allows for the extension of existing licenses for forest exploitation under 
the condition that the license for the business remains valid, regardless of its environmental 
integrity and whether they are on high conservation value (HCV) forest at the time or not (Enrici, 
2016).  
The third exception is awarded to lands needed for ‘vital’ national development projects 
(including geothermal, oil and natural gas, electricity, rice, and sugarcane), regardless of their 
proximity to conservation areas. The moratorium must therefore be compatible with past 
presidential instructions, such as InPres No. 5/2011 on food security, which stipulates that the 
Minister of Agriculture expand the area of food production, and that the Minister of Forestry 
allow it to happen (Murdiyarso, 2011). The mention of electricity in this exception also includes 
coal mining, a major driver of deforestation responsible for an estimated 10% of deforestation in 
Indonesia as of 2005 (Enrici, 2016). From 2000 to 2014, Indonesia’s coal exports quadrupled, 
and the country recently overtook Australia to become the world’s largest exporter of thermal 
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coal (Dunne, 2019). Approximately 80% of Indonesia’s coal is exported, but plans to increase 
the country’s domestic coal-powered generation, and thus potentially close the “electricity gap” 
between its wealthy and less-connected islands are in effect (Dunne, 2019). This drive to 
increase domestic coal use and coal exports is another example of policies intended for economic 
development conflicting with strategies to curtail emissions from deforestation.  
The fourth exception, Ecosystem Restoration Concessions (ERC), has the potential to be 
quite positive, as it creates new opportunities to enhance carbon stocks through reforestation. 
These concessions are critical to REDD+ implementation, as it allows REDD+ projects to be 
carried out in forests officially designated for production. Forests available for logging, mining, 
and agricultural concessions could therefore instead be converted into REDD+ projects, thus 
marking the first time in which production forests could be managed for restoration instead of 
exploitation (Enrici, 2016; Fay, 2018). Ecosystem restoration involves efforts to return 
deforested, degraded, or damaged production forests back to their biological equilibrium (Fay, 
2018). ERCs would grant rights to the land for 65 years with a possible 35-year extension. These 
long-term concessions are intended to resolve some of the permanence issues that must be 
addressed before reforestation can become irreversible (Murdiyarso, 2011).  
Some conservation organizations, and later, private corporations, began to see the 
opportunity to obtain ERCs, protect their ecosystems, and profit from avoided emissions. By the 
end of 2017, 16 ERCs had been issued, covering an area just over 600,000 hectares. However, a 
viable business model has failed to emerge, and efforts by conservation organizations to improve 
the design have yet to succeed. This is due in part to the fact that the contracts continue to be 
modeled on logging concessions where profit is based on timber extraction, instead of assisted 
natural regeneration of production forests (Fay, 2018). Although there are cases of ERCs 
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successfully rehabilitating critical lands, such as with peatland restoration in Central Kalimantan, 
most ERC concessions have not fared so well, with some having poor relations with 
communities inside and adjacent to their concessions (Fay, 2018). 
 
Part 3: Lack of Local Community Involvement  
REDD+ has fallen well short of its goals to involve all major stakeholders, particularly 
indigenous peoples and local communities. The LoI’s design allowed significant space for 
independent participation by indigenous communities both in implementation and monitoring 
(Fay, 2018). In some instances, local communities have had their rights largely ignored as more 
powerful stakeholders get their way. While the recognition of “Indigenous Forests” (forests 
legally private and collectively owned by indigenous communities) was a milestone for the 
Widodo administration, they still fall under the jurisdiction of the MoEF in terms of regulating 
their management (Fay, 2018). This poses a problem due to the MoEF’s weak governance 
capacity, especially because indigenous communities can be taken advantage of from 
exploitative corporations.  
 One example of this occurred in 2012, when leaders from nine villages held a protest 
outside the local legislature to oppose a palm oil concession that threatened to annex thousands 
of hectares of community forests. Regulations required an inventory of customary lands through 
a mapping process prior to any land being licensed, to protect the local community’s lands. 
However, prior to this mapping taking place, the palm oil corporation had already begun its 
process of land acquisition, simply by paying the community a flat rate of USD $200 per hectare 
(Permitting Crime, 2014). This fell well short of the process required to properly evaluate land 
rights claims, especially because it failed to take communal ownership of the Indigenous Forest 
into account. By the time the mapping of customary lands was completed, it was too late—most 
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of the villagers had already conceded to selling their lands by that point (Permitting Crime, 
2014). Not only were these communities quickly and secretly manipulated into selling their 
lands, but they were also barred from extracting any resources from the forests once they did, a 
restriction that was apparently brutally enforced by the corporation in charge (Permitting Crime, 
2014). The MoEF’s lack of capacity shines through in instances like these, where massive 
corporations exploit not only the resources, but the livelihoods of those civilians dependent on 
them.  
Indonesia has a long history of not recognizing indigenous community rights. Prior to 
2013, only 1% of forest cover in the country was recognized officially as community forest. 
Indonesian Forestry Law empowers the government to manage the forest, which allows it to 
continue allocating licensing concessions. This fact detracts from the rights of local 
communities, however, because they don’t have rights over the lands they use and cannot 
exclude outside interests from exploiting the forest (Stevens, 2014). In Indonesia, community 
rights to lands are not only neglected, but government actions often have further negative 
impacts, as they undermine community rights even more by imposing excessive bureaucratic 
obstacles, granting concessions within community forest, and colluding with local elites to 
capture high-value forest resources (see Fig. 3.1) (Stevens, 2014). When community rights are 
not legally recognized by the government, it is far more likely that the lands these communities 
depend on will be degraded or destroyed (Stevens, 2014). 
There is strong evidence in the literature that weak or no recognition from the 
government of community forest rights is tightly linked to high deforestation rates. In Indonesia, 
few potentially eligible communities have obtained legal recognition of their forest under 
Forestry Law. Of at least 42 million hectares of customarily held community lands, only one 
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million hectares are legally recognized by the government. Weak rights over their customary 
forests allow conversion licenses to be distributed over their lands, thus contributing to 
deforestation and GHG emissions (Stevens, 2014). There is also evidence that legal forest rights 
and government protection of those rights tend to lower deforestation. In Brazil, for example, a 
6% higher deforestation rate outside of indigenous community lands contributed to 27 times 
more CO2 emissions than were produced within the community forest. Furthermore, these 
community forests contain 36% more carbon per hectare than other parts of the Brazilian 
Amazon (Stevens, 2014). Thus, stronger ownership rights over customary lands contributes to 
forest health and protection, lessons that Indonesia could incorporate into its reforestation and 
forest rehabilitation efforts.   
Figure 3.1: Government Actions That Can Impact Community Forest Rights 
          Source: Stevens, 2014 
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Although stipulated in the LoI that local communities would have a large say in how 
REDD+ activities in their districts were implemented, REDD+ projects have largely ignored 
local communities. A 2018 report intent on discovering locals’ attitudes towards REDD+ found 
that in none of the four sites they visited had REDD+ activities commenced (Casse, 2019). The 
report claims that in general, villagers were “totally unacquainted with the implications of the 
REDD+ program,” and that a large majority were unaware that crop farming was not allowed in 
REDD+ forests. In three out of four of these villages, deforestation rates had actually increased 
from 2010 to 2017 (Casse, 2019). A large concern with the REDD+ design is that it focuses 
disproportionately on restricting the activities of poor forest dwellers, instead of targeting more 
those who exploit forest resources and contribute to deforestation. Failing to involve local 
communities and recognize their rights has impeded REDD+ activities, for without knowledge of 
the projects and how they operate, as well as long-term incentives to be involved in the project, 
community-focused implementation projects are destined to fail. 
Another significant problem for locals and their ability to maintain ownership of their 
lands is ‘contested tenure,’ or ambiguity of local land ownership and titles. Overlapping tenure 
occurs when licenses are issued that contradict the MoF official forest use designation, an issue 
that arises from discrepancies over which level of government has authority over the land. 
Tenure conflicts can exist for any combination of stakeholders; for example, palm oil licenses on 
community forest, smallholder palm oil encroachment onto REDD+ projects, or mining in 
National Parks (Enrici, 2016). Tenure conflicts are well documented and pervasive, and they 
occur for different reasons, including corruption, exceptions made to forest protection laws, and 
particularly because of the overlapping authority among different levels of government. Due to 
these underlying issues, Indonesia faces greater consequences than just tenure conflicts, for the 
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country’s inability to formally and permanently designate protected areas is at stake. There are 
instances of licenses existing in protection and conservation forests, such as the 13 mining 
corporations that, as of 2011, were operating in a protection forest spanning 850,000 hectares 
(Enrici, 2016).  
Issues arising from overlapping tenures are particularly relevant to local communities and 
their rights to the forest. Indigenous peoples’ rights to the forest are already institutionally 
challenged in Indonesia, as evidenced by the fact that in 2014, the GoI recognized less than 1% 
of Indonesia’s forest as community forest (Enrici, 2016). Across the country, forest-dependent 
communities have been living on and using official (MoF recognized) forest for generations, yet 
the land is generally considered to be owned by the state. Community land can be licensed by the 
state to private interests for exploitative purposes. In 2014 in West Kalimantan, for example, 
59% of community forest was covered by palm oil concessions waiting to be activated (Enrici, 
2016). Once activated, these communities lose all access to the lands that have maintained their 
livelihoods for generations, and they have very little power to oppose the conversion.  
 
Part 4: Indonesia’s Social Forestry Program and Its Challenges 
One manner in which Indonesia has tried to alleviate tenure conflicts and provide more 
support for forest-dependent communities is through its Social Forestry Program. The roots of 
this program date back to the late 1990’s, when the national forestry minister issued a first-of-its-
kind decree, giving a community in Sumatra the right to manage 29,000 hectares of provincial 
forest to operate damar agroforests (Shahab, 2018). The pioneering social forestry community 
has seen many positive results, including increase in forest cover, food security, and income 
generation. These results demonstrated that social forestry could benefit many stakeholders at 
once and inspired the Widodo administration in 2014 to agree to distribute 12.7 million hectares 
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of forests to forest-dependent communities by 2019 (Shahab, 2018). This ambitious goal would 
expand social forestry designations from 1% to over 10% of the Forest Estate (Fisher, 2018). The 
concept emerged in Indonesia as a policy priority because of constant tenure issues questioning 
who has rights to land. Government and advocacy groups alike have supported social forestry 
due to its attractive win-win-win solution, acknowledging that it has the potential to improve 
rural livelihood opportunities, recognize communal rights, support conservation, and crucially, 
solve Indonesia’s complex land conflicts (Fisher, 2018). The government’s goals for social 
forestry have progressed more slowly than planned. As of 2018, only 1.75 million hectares worth 
of permits were distributed, amounting to 15% of the total target (Shahab, 2018). Given the 
difficulty of meeting its ambitious goal by 2019, the MoEF lowered its target from 12.7 million 
to 4.3 million hectares (Fisher, 2018).   
Social forestry has started slowly because of complicated permit acquisition processes 
and the need for a constellation of community support mechanisms. Prior to 2016, a community 
seeking to obtain a social forestry permit was required to follow procedures similar to those 
necessary to acquire large concession licenses, a process both complex and expensive, lasting 
typically 180 days. To simplify this process and thus adjust for a more rights-oriented approach, 
the MoEF passed a new decree (83/2016) in 2016 to streamline the process (Fisher, 2018). 
Preparing the permits for proposal processes remains arduous for local communities, and often 
requires intervention from consultants to prepare needed documentation. The complicated permit 
requirements are impediments to local farmers, who may give up before completing the 
necessary organizational statutes, in which case no progress is made.  
Another issue is that many communities that have received permits have yet to reap any 
benefits, for they lack an understanding of how to properly implement them (Shahab, 2018). The 
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MoEF has developed agencies to assist social forestry enterprises with human resources and 
business development. These support mechanisms are meant to help communities facilitate 
social forestry measures after permit issuance and focus on long-term business development. 
However, the support system itself faces internal challenges, as the number of counselors has 
dropped in recent years to only 15% of the number needed, a complication caused by recruitment 
regulation (Shahab, 2018).  
Inconsistent boundaries and an inability of support systems to confer real authority 
represent two major barriers to local communities. In three village social forestry programs, 
inaccurate mapping data and differing perceptions of boundaries created misunderstanding, and 
resulted in more difficult policy negotiations (Fisher, 2018). Synchronizing the country’s maps 
under the One Map Policy has continued to challenge the MoEF, for new and historical claims to 
land are often in conflict, which ends up impeding any project dependent on accurate and 
consistent boundaries. Remapping efforts could provide the first step toward transparency and 
accountability needed to manage social forestry sites.   
The complex community permit process requires outside intervention for drafting 
designation plans to acquire permits. While the plans may be comprehensive, little attention is 
focused on supporting local institutions with the knowledge and authority to implement the plans 
themselves (Fisher, 2018). NGOs and other organizations can assist in mapping, designating, and 
drafting plans for permits. There are few support systems to incorporate local management 
practices into the plans, which undermines social forestry. One analyst reports that by failing to 
empower local institutions with the support and authority to monitor and manage conservation 
areas, these support systems are bound to run counter to the intended conservation goals of social 
forestry, and thus these programs will fail to reap any real benefits (Fisher, 2018). The role of 
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external institutions to help meet administrative requirements undermines local authority, as they 
may not assess local considerations and therefore neglect the natural resource management, 
memory, knowledge, and experience of local communities (Fisher, 2018). The lack of land 
management goals and capacity building means that social forestry can become “just another 
project with lofty development and societal goals, reinforcing the institutional arrangements it 
purports to challenge” (Fisher, 2018).  
 
Part 5: Forest Conservation Versus Economic Growth 
At the heart of all the forces impeding Indonesia’s ability to meet its 2030 climate goals 
is the country’s conflict between its conservation efforts and economic development aspirations. 
The nation’s target of reducing GHG emissions by 29% while maintaining a 7% annual GDP 
growth rate designates Indonesia as a “green economy” on paper. The reality is that a significant 
gap exists between these national ambitions and what is actually happening on the ground 
(Anderson, 2016). Existing plans to further expand palm oil production is at odds with provincial 
efforts to reduce emissions. For Indonesia to see success as a green economy will require 
compromises and trade-offs among stakeholders (Anderson, 2016). Economic development 
rooted in exploitative practices still prevails, as indicated by the fact that 70% of Indonesia’s 
total land area is under commoditization arrangements, although some are ‘virtual’ or not yet 
developed (Fisher, 2018). Exploitative corporations have the means to undermine conservation 
efforts. Different Ministries develop contradicting regulations. Extractive industries, backed by 
power and money, still prevail over conservation, as discussed below.  
Policies meant to enforce REDD+ and inhibit deforestation are in direct conflict with 
Indonesia’s policies regarding economic expansion. The inefficiency that results from this 
conflict of interest is a result of the country trying to balance increasing economic growth with 
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forest conservation. Policies created for mining and agriculture impede REDD+ implementation, 
for each sector issues policies in accordance with its own interests. Mining practices can only be 
conducted once forests are cleared, so the Ministry of Mining often pressures the MoEF to 
allocate forest areas to mining activities (Ekawati, 2019). These activities occur mostly in 
heavily forested areas and are frequently established illegally in areas designated for 
conservation or forest protection (Enrici, 2016). The Ministry of Agriculture encourages the 
development of more palm oil plantations, reducing forested areas that REDD+ could conserve. 
Plantation owners may encroach onto forested areas, an activity exacerbated by rising prices for 
palm oil (Ekawati, 2019). From 2000-2010, palm oil on Kalimantan expanded by 278%, and 
90% of this occurred on forested land. Sumatra and Kalimantan, both known for their high levels 
of biodiversity, are the nation’s islands with the highest rates of forest loss from plantation 
expansion. From 2000-2012, Sumatra lost 17.6% of its overall forest cover, and Kalimantan lost 
7.9%. Global demand and high prices for timber have also encouraged the government to create 
policies allowing for intensive timber harvesting, a practice that deeply contradicts REDD+ 











Topic 4: Opportunities for REDD+ in Indonesia 
 
 
The setbacks Indonesia has suffered, as described in previous sections, have hampered 
efforts to achieve its carbon-related goals. Nevertheless, opportunities to make progress remain. 
This section identifies policies that hold the potential for success, if conducted and administered 
properly. Some of these policies include more comprehensive protection for peatlands and 
primary forests and the development of a single map to integrate data from across all ministries, 
thereby increasing transparency and reducing boundary disputes. 
 
Part 1: Peatland Restoration and Protection 
Five years ago, the majority of Indonesians did not understand the importance of 
peatlands and their difference from other kinds of land. However, after 2.6 million hectares of 
Indonesian land was scorched in 2015, 33% of which was on peatlands, the people gained a 
better understanding of what was at stake. The 2015 wildfires produced huge amounts of “toxic 
haze,” enough to reach the neighboring countries of Singapore and Malaysia and sicken half a 
million people (Liu, 2018). Exacerbated by an El Niño year that caused an unusually severe dry 
spell, the fires raged on for months, and ultimately cost the country an estimated $16 million in 
economic losses (Jong, 2019, November 25). In January 2016, as a response to the devastating 
fires, President Widodo created the Peatland Restoration Agency (BRG), with the mandate of 
restoring 2.4 million hectares of peatlands in seven provinces by 2020 (Ekawati, 2019). BRG has 
worked to rewet peat ecosystems, facilitate and empower community economies, build 
demonstrations for integrated peat farming plots, and install water level monitoring devices 
(Ekawati, 2019). These activities have helped train over 150 local communities in the 
construction of canal blockings, land preparation without the use of draining and fire clearing 
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practices, and alternative livelihoods using restored peatlands to drive behavioral change (Liu, 
2018). Peatland restoration efforts have been carried out in protected areas and unlicensed 
cultivation areas. While this is certainly a cause for optimism, restoration in permit or concession 
areas remains modest. According to 2019 data from BRG, between 2016 and 2018 the program 
restored 679,901 hectares, less than one third of the 2.4-million-hectare target (Ekawati, 2019).  
Another positive outcome that arose from the ashes of the 2015 fires was Government 
Regulation No. 57/2016, which regulates peatland use based on peat depth and limits the 
drainage depth to 40 cm. Law enforcement to protect these peatlands was strengthened. In 2018, 
community-based firefighter groups were trained to prevent wildfires (Liu, 2018), which seemed 
to work, for forest loss on peatlands deeper than 3 meters dropped 80% in 2018 compared to the 
2002-2016 average (Weiss, 2019). The decline may reflect the fact that the years 2016 to 2018 
were relatively wet, reducing the likelihood of a strong fire season like the one in 2015. On the 
other hand, 2019 was another El Niño year, and the dry conditions contributed to a prolonged 
fire season, with the most intense fires observed since 2015 (Jong, 2019, November 25). By the 
close of November 2019, the fires had pumped out at least 708 million tons of CO2, almost 
double the amount released by the higher-profile fires in the Brazilian Amazon (Jong, 2019, 
November 25), which will put Indonesia back on the list of top global emitters, and threaten to 
derail the country’s commitment to cut its emissions. Indonesia therefore has a major opportunity 
to further improve its capacity to monitor and protect peatlands, as well as restore them, to 
prevent future fires from spreading into another catastrophe like this. 
 
Part 2: Declining Deforestation Rates 
A cause for optimism is Indonesia’s declining deforestation rate, especially in 2017 and 
2018 (deforestation rates for 2019 are at present not available). Deforestation of a total of 
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480,000 hectares of land occurred in 2017, followed by 440,000 hectares lost in 2018 (Wijaya, 
2019). These numbers are edging closer to Indonesia’s Nationally Determined Contributions to 
the Paris Climate Agreement, which aims to limit annual deforestation to 325,000 hectares 
between 2020 and 2030 (Wijaya, 2019). Indonesia reduced its primary forest loss by 40% in 
2018, reaching its lowest rate since 2003. In areas protected by the moratorium, primary forest 
loss dropped 45% compared with 2002-2016 levels (Weisse, 2019). Several factors contributed 
to the 2018 reduction in deforestation rates, including strengthened law enforcement to prevent 
fires and land-clearing, peatland restoration efforts, the moratorium, and the absence of El Niño-
driven hot spells (Wijaya, 2019). Nevertheless, there are exceptions to Indonesia’s overall 
decline in deforestation. These include the provinces of East Kalimantan, Maluku, and West 
Papua, which in 2018 experienced respectively a 43%, 40%, and 36% increase in primary forest 
loss compared to 2017. In Central Kalimantan alone, a total of 1,495,745 ha of primary forest 
was lost in 2018 (Wijaya, 2019). These are significant exceptions to the decline in deforestation, 
particularly when taking into consideration the fact that 2018 suffered little from deforestation 
induced by wildfires. Data on primary forest loss in 2019 is still unavailable, but deforestation 
rates will be higher, given the months of wildfires endured that year. Analysts evaluating the 
moratorium report that it is doing little to deter primary forest loss, for it yielded only a 5% 
decrease in primary forest loss compared to areas outside of the moratorium (Ekawati, 2019).  
 
Part 3: The One Map Initiative  
Facts on the ground affect Indonesia’s forest governance, including boundary disputes, 
tenure issues, and contradictory land classifications by various government levels. Through the 
country’s One Map Initiative (OMI), encouraged by President Yudhoyono in 2010, Indonesia 
has an opportunity to resolve geographic ambiguities. The OMI was created in response to 
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concerns from the REDD+ Task Force about how to accurately create the Indicative Moratorium 
Map (IMM) necessary to institute the beginning of the moratorium on new licensing 
concessions. Discrepancies in land-cover maps among different industries made publishing the 
IMM a challenge. The OMI was developed to improve communication among government 
ministries/agencies, as well as between GoI agencies and indigenous communities or civil 
society organizations (Mulyani, 2017). Catalyzed by REDD+ policy, the OMI signifies a move 
towards greater transparency and public participation in an effort to embody the principles of 
open democracy. The government’s commitment to store, curate, and integrate all spatial and 
non-spatial information from across ministries and levels of government in one place, as well as 
providing the public free access to this portal, signifies a major shift in established institutional 
practice. During just the map-making exercise, the OMI promoted a number of positive 
governance reforms, including better coordination among government ministries, greater 
transparency and public participation, improved cost efficiency and forest data quality, and the 
protection of indigenous lands (Mulyani, 2017). These positive outcomes inspired President 
Widodo in 2015 to accelerate the implementation of the OMI and place it high on the National 
Development Priority list.  
The OMI helps REDD+ by its effort to clarify forest land categories where REDD+ 
activities can take place. Transparency of forest data reduces the risk that REDD+ sites will be 
undermined later by overlapping concessions. According to analysts, accurate forest land-cover 
maps are essential to the efficacy of REDD+ implementation (Mulyani, 2017). The OMI is a 
means for Indonesia to address forest governance problems, but only if it is conducted 
thoroughly and transparently. After almost eight years since the OMI was proposed, it was 
finally released in December of 2018 by President Widodo. At the launch, Widodo described the 
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Initiative, saying, “One reference, one database, and one geoportal, which essentially is set to 
prevent any overlap, to give certainty, to give clarity, and to have consistency in building this 
nation” (Gokkon, 2018). Overlapping land-use permits and boundary disputes are major drivers 
of illegal industries operating in prohibited areas. The OMI provides hope for greater protection 
of primary forests and for deterring illegal palm oil, mining, and timber operations in unlicensed 
areas. 
Although the OMI was designed to be transparent and open to the public, recent 
developments have shown that the government maintains restricted access to spatial data 
(Arumingtyas, 2017). The government has been particularly secretive about maps related to the 
extractive industries, and this appears to extend into the OMI as well. The GoI is also reportedly 
drafting regulations that will govern data sharing and determine who has access to the unified 
database, an act that undermines the government’s stipulated efforts to be more transparent 
(Gokkon, 2018).  
The GoI has failed to include maps of indigenous territory in the OMI, even though some 
of these territorial maps were already recognized by lower-level authorities. The national 
government claims that these customary lands will be included once recognized by local 
governments, an arduous and time-consuming process, requiring the passage of a bylaw in each 
of the hundreds of jurisdictions where indigenous lands occur (Gokkon, 2018). The exclusion of 
indigenous lands from maps has drawn criticism from indigenous rights activists, who argue that 
it undermines the Initiative’s stated goal of resolving land-use conflicts, many of which involve 
disputes over indigenous lands.  
Current maps do include customary forests, however, which are areas recognized by the 
MoEF as being a part of the country’s Social Forestry Program aimed at increasing land access 
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and ownership for local communities. According to the map, as of 2018, a mere 77 square miles 
of land was granted to about 20 different communities under the customary forest program, a 
figure that falls short of the goal to give local communities access to a combined 48,700 square 
miles of customary forest (Gokkon, 2018). The failure of the OMI to maintain transparency and 
inclusion of all relevant data can only be described as a missed opportunity to get the country on 
the path towards more effective forest governance. 
Despite the Indonesian government’s decision to forfeit the OMI’s transparency and 
restrict the public’s access to the data it contains, the creation and publication of one integrated 
database to record all relevant forestry data is a success. Synchronizing forestry data from across 
all ministries and differing levels of government has forced officials to coordinate and 
compromise in ways that Indonesian forest governance has never experienced before, creating 
the opportunity to reduce barriers that arise from instances of overlapping authority. Overcoming 
boundary disputes and tenure problems through the creation of the OMI represents a significant 
step towards more effective forest governance. Releasing the complete OMI and integrated 
database to all members of the public, as well as including the nation’s most marginalized people 
on the map, are further steps that ought to be taken to provide the transparency needed to 









Topic 5: Recommendations for Improving Forest Governance in Indonesia 
 
 
 This section discusses recommendations to improve the efficacy and capacity of 
Indonesia’s REDD+ program, as well as possible revisions of other forestry and non-forestry 
related regulations. If Indonesia fails to institute a number of critical reforms, it is unlikely that it 
will achieve its conservation, emissions, or environmental protection goals. As a country with the 
ability to change the course for tropical forest conservation around the world, the GoI can decide 
whether to continue enabling resource-extractive industries over the wellbeing of many of its 
citizens and the entire planet.  
 
Recommendation 1: Recreate the National REDD+ Agency 
The most important recommendation is to recreate an independent REDD+ Agency to 
improve REDD+ implementation. The first step would be to separate the REDD+ Agency from 
under the MoEF’s umbrella and allow the Agency to once again become a regulatory body. Prior 
to Widodo absorbing the Agency into the MoEF, the Agency developed important relationships 
with many stakeholders, created many important reforms for instituting REDD+ policies, and 
became an institution that local communities could approach to present their needs (Fay, 2018). 
Hiding the Agency under the regulatory power of the MoEF essentially decreased the Agency’s 
authority and its capacity to monitor how and if new regulations were being implemented on the 
ground. If the REDD+ Agency could be independent from and parallel in authority to other 
Ministries, it could be run more efficiently with greater authority to enforce its regulations. If 
closing moratorium loopholes and enforcing greater sanctions are priorities, the REDD+ Agency 
with no other conflicting incentives has the ability to accomplish its goals (Fay, 2018). 
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  Even without a new REDD+ Agency that could integrate action plans into the programs 
of the Directorate General of Climate Change, Indonesia could strengthen the legality and 
legitimacy of the REDD+ National Strategy. Incorporating REDD+ SRAP into regional 
development programs would make the action plans more accessible to people on the ground and 
help implement REDD+ on a regional level (Ekawati, 2019). Currently, only 11 of 34 provinces 
have formulated REDD+ SRAP, a number that after 10 years of REDD+ operating in Indonesia 
should be much higher (Ekawati, 2019). A new REDD+ Agency could crack down on corruption 
and other illegal activities through more policing and greater enforcement of regulations. 
Punishing actors with ties to corruption with sanctions could set an example for more controlled 
forest governance.  
 
Recommendation 2: Revise the Moratorium 
Revising the moratorium to close its many loopholes could change the status quo, 
particularly for the extractive industries that lobbied heavily to permit those loopholes. One 
analyst reported that had the moratorium not been in place between 2011 and 2015, emission 
rates would likely have only been 1.0-2.7% higher than with the moratorium in effect, a clear 
measure of its ineffectiveness (Anderson, 2016). This estimate is based on the fact that a 
majority of emissions from deforestation came from outside existing concessions and areas 
protected by the moratorium. To be effective at reducing emissions from deforestation and 
degradation, a moratorium ought to include all lands classified as forests, whether institutionally 
recognized or not, so as to include secondary forests (Enrici, 2016). If a REDD+ Agency could 
manage all forests and their concessions, it could address the full range of encroachment, land 
classification conflicts, tenure disputes, unmonitored deforestation, and indigenous rights. 
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One way to enhance the moratorium would be to extend its scope beyond ‘primary’ 
forests, which has been interpreted to mean only land untouched by humans. By not including all 
natural forests, as was agreed upon in the LoI, tens of millions of hectares of secondary forests 
were left open to new licenses for conversion to plantations. A majority of these secondary 
forests fall within indigenous territories, leading to tenure disputes, encroachment, and local 
communities being forced off their lands (Fay, 2018). Revising the IMM to include both licensed 
and unlicensed secondary and logged-over forests would be the next major step, beginning with 
forest on peat and then covering forest found on mineral soils, which have high conservation 
values (HCV) for biodiversity, watershed protection, and other ecosystem services (Murdiyarso, 
2011). 
Another step to enhance the moratorium would be to correct misclassifications of forest 
types and update maps with dated information. Areas of peat and primary forests that have not 
been licensed for protection could be rezoned and included in the moratorium. Another task is to 
review existing licenses for ongoing operations for compliance with environmental and other 
regulations, or risk being suspended or revoked. A review process could influence developers 
who so far may have ignored national land use regulations. 
 Another step would be to create an environmental impact assessment to document 
development projects on peatlands that have significant adverse impacts on the environment. In 
this way, stakeholders responsible for environmental damage can be held accountable, while 
those involved in ecosystem restoration can be applauded (Murdiyarso, 2011).  
In summary, removal of unnecessary ambiguity would improve outcomes. When there 
are conflicting regulations, the governing body has the option to choose among them. Agency 
choice over when to enforce restrictions and when to turn a ‘blind eye’ is propagated by the 
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contradictory and confusing language and classifications present in the moratorium. The 
classification system of “official” forest under the MoF (institutionally recognized), creates 
undue complexity for regulations, and contributes further to weak institutional capacity because 
authorities don’t know which forested areas are recognized as official, and which are not. The 
ambiguity also allows for more opportunities for corruption and mismanagement of resources, 
for those in charge may not even know who is out of bounds and who is not.  
The definition of “primary” forest needs to be firmly established in the moratorium as 
well, for now there are discrepancies concerning whether it means untouched lands or unlicensed 
lands. As defined by the UN FAO, primary forests are those that have had minimal human 
disturbance, a definition that could firmly protect old-growth, untouched forests, regardless of 
whether or not they’ve been licensed in the past. Past licenses awarded on primary lands could 
be revoked to deter the expansion of further destruction of irreplaceable old-growth forests.  
“Secondary” forests must also be redefined and separated from the term “degraded,” 
which insinuates land too far gone to be restored. Secondary forests, making up over half of 
Indonesia’s forested areas, are in dire need of protection. Often, they have been hardly disturbed 
by human activities, and have the potential to be fully restored if given permanent protection. By 
classifying these forests, which continue to support massive amounts of biodiversity and carbon 
storage, as degraded, Indonesia is essentially awarding half the country’s forests to extractive 
industries. An independent REDD+ Agency could revise the moratorium so as to decrease 
deforestation and actually reduce emissions.  
 
Recommendation 3: Focus on Primary Forests and Peatlands 
Indonesia’s vulnerability to climate forces such as El Niño events makes taking 
preventative actions to diminish adverse climate effects crucial. These actions include 
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monitoring and protecting peatlands, as well as preventing and extinguishing wildfires. One 
policy option could be revoking any concessions on peatlands and preventing future illegal 
encroachment onto these carbon-rich lands. For peatlands that have been drained for agricultural 
purposes, reducing the risk of fires breaking out could require some level of restoration and 
rewetting of the land. Slash-and-burn clearing practices, which can easily lead to fires spiraling 
out of control, can be replaced by innovative land clearing that does not use fire or peatland 
drainage practices. Draining peatlands can be prevented regardless of the peat’s depth, for the 
drainage in itself is a huge emitter, and exposed peat is a catastrophe waiting to happen. These 
agricultural practices can be monitored to ensure they are following protocol, which requires 
greater funding and institutional capacity. Further preventative measures such as training local 
communities in firefighting practices and providing more funding to police remote peatlands 
could improve outcomes. Greater capacity and foresight to prevent wildfires has the ability to 
save Indonesia billions of dollars, especially as the climate becomes more volatile. Extended dry 
seasons pose a huge danger to Indonesia’s people, biodiversity, and economy, and therefore any 
effort that can be taken to reduce the chances of more fires like those in 2015 and 2019 should be 
taken.  
 
Recommendation 4: Revise the One Map Initiative 
The OMI development of one database and one map to integrate what was once at least 
85 disparate official maps is a feat to be applauded. The One-Map policy is an absolutely 
essential component for any competent forest management practices to designate where 
boundaries are drawn, to whom permit licenses belong, and to denote each type of land use. 
Despite its release in 2018, public access to the database and map is restricted, reducing 
transparency and increasing suspicions that certain stakeholders have more leverage than others 
 88 
over how the mapping process is conducted. The OMI has the potential to bridge 
communications and spatial data for all relevant ministries and civil society, but only if revised 
to fix these issues of complete access and representation. Only then can the OMI function as it 
has been intended to since its inception, which is to resolve boundary disputes and prevent 
exploitation of forests by making protected areas clearly, and unambiguously, defined as 
protected.  
 
Recommendation 5: Revitalize the Social Forestry Program 
For REDD+ to be successful in Indonesia, much more attention must be paid towards the 
local communities losing land access and disputing tenure claims. Without the support of district 
governments in instituting REDD+ reforms, actions to follow new regulations may not take 
place, thus undermining national policies. Clear communication among district and regional 
governments and the REDD+ Agency could enhance program implementation by creating an 
entry point for communities to discuss land reform and distribution. This was an essential 
component of REDD+ outlined in the LoI, yet it never fulfilled its true potential. Developing a 
space for open discussion that involves all stakeholders will certainly take time, effort, and 
unique approaches to different communities, for broad, national blanket policies have been 
largely ineffective in motivating these communities.  
 For example, REDD+ and the country’s Social Forestry Program have many aligned 
goals and together they may make a bigger impact than apart. An important issue with REDD+ 
projects near community lands thus far has been a lack of permanence. Given the common 
encroachment and land dispute issues plaguing local and indigenous communities, some 
residents may have been hesitant to develop long-term sustainable land use practices for fear of 
their land being annexed by large corporate forces. The Social Forestry Program is a way for 
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communities to safeguard land from these outside forces by providing community ownership 
over lands that can then be developed into sustainable agroforestry or ecotourism spaces. 
Ownership can create a means of long-term income generation that is not dependent on limited 
resource extraction. In many ways, this sounds like REDD+’s vision to protect and manage 
forests in innovative ways that allow for small-scale development amidst rehabilitation efforts. 
While the Social Forestry Program has had some successes, the program lacks funding, and the 
support systems needed to incorporate locals into community planning and action are 
understaffed. Furthermore, even when properly staffed, these institutions often fail to teach 
locals the technical skills needed to develop alternative revenue streams, leaving them bound to 
fail.  
 With proper management and oversight, these problems can be resolved. This calls for 
increased funding for the program to acquire the capacity to reach local communities and expend 
the needed effort to properly communicate how the program works and what benefits the 
community could receive by following it. At present, the program needs annual funding of at 
least USD $57 million, yet currently it receives just half this amount (Jong, 2019, January 25). 
One way to increase funding for the Social Forestry Program would be to tap into the 
Reforestation Fund. Both programs, at their core, are about rehabilitating critical land in 
sustainable ways. Therefore, incorporating local participation can only complement the 
reforestation efforts of the RF. With local communities motivated to restore and protect their 
lands, the impact will likely be greater than any land rehabilitation project that doesn’t involve 
local residents. The Social Forestry Program also has the ability to increase these communities’ 
welfare. By allowing communities long-term authority over their own lands, it motivates them to 
continue rehabilitation efforts and create alternative, sustainable land use practices, such as 
 90 
beekeeping or resin harvesting. Ownership over lands instills pride over lands, and when 
communities are proud, they have something to protect. Without it, residents are likely to 
continue operating on small-scale plantations or extractive industries, which provide short-term 
income. In order to motivate a complete change in lifestyle, these communities need proper 
incentives, support, and trust in the government. This may take a long time to build, but with a 
new REDD+ Agency to administer this support and an open line of communication with 
government forces, the Social Forestry Program, along with the Reforestation Fund’s efforts and 
those of REDD+, have the potential to see far greater success than they have thus far in 
protecting and rehabilitating Indonesia’s ‘priceless’ tropical forests.   
 While working in Indonesia in the Summer of 2018 to quantify carbon stores on Buton 
Island near Sulawesi, I was involved in efforts to bring the Social Forestry Program to 
communities. In a small, one-mile community named Labundo-bundo, ownership of surrounding 
lands was being distributed to members of the community. For protecting the natural forests 
instead of clearing them for coconut or palm oil plantations, the communities were promised to 
be awarded through REDD+ financing. In addition, the village’s women, who are critical for 
bringing the benefits of new community developments into the home, were heavily consulted on 
new strategies for alternative revenue streams into the community. If individuals or groups had 
ideas for creating a new business or sustainable agroforestry project, they could consult REDD+ 
administrators for a loan to get their project started. In this way, we worked from the ground up, 
encouraging communities to motivate themselves to look beyond the limited forest resources to 
new means for income generation that could sustain these people in the long term. Once the 
people had a reason to conserve their biodiversity, and could maintain healthy livelihoods 
without its exploitation, a sense of pride in their lands and their work was born.  
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Regardless of the structural problems plaguing Indonesia's efforts to conserve forests and 
reduce emissions, seeing the pride of a community involved with rehabilitating the lands that 
have sustained them for centuries gave me hope. With enough money, capacity, and motivation, 
communities all across Indonesia can be reached and encouraged to join the movement to save 
Indonesia’s imperiled forests. Community involvement can have a profound impact on REDD+ 
progress. The challenge is less about national policies than it is implementing these policies in 
small local communities across the thousands of islands that make up the unique and 
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